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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Drug abuse is a serious problem in the United States. According to the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in 2007 about 3.7 percent of the U.S.
population aged twelve years old or older (9.3 million people) were current illicit drug users who
used drugs other than marijuana (the most commonly used illicit drug) (SAMHSA, 2008).
Chronic drug users are also likely to be the perpetrators and victims of criminal activity (French,
et al., 2004); chronic drug users also use more inpatient and emergency care than others (French,
et al., 2000).
Illicit drug users abusing prescription pain relievers—including opioid pain relievers such
as Oxycontin, Percocet, Tylox, Percodan, hydrocodone, and morphine—were estimated to stand
at 5.2 million, or 2.1 percent of the population twelve years old or older. This is a statistically
significant increase from the 2004 rate of 1.8 percent. The number of current heroin users in
2007 fell to only 0.06 percent of the twelve-or-older population, down from 0.14 percent in
2006. Prescription opioids are the primary substance of abuse for 18% of substance abuse
treatment admissions (SAMHSA, 2006).
Opioid abuse is serious not only because of its prevalence but also because of its toll. In
2006, 38 of the metropolitan areas covered by the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) had
30 or more drug-related deaths (Ball & Albright, 2009). In all but three of these metropolitan
areas, opiates and other opioids were involved in more deaths than any other drug. In each of the
three metropolitan areas where opiates/opioids were not involved in the most drug-related
deaths, they were a close second; cocaine was involved in fewer than ten more deaths. The
urgency of combating opioid dependence to reduce the number of drug-related deaths can be

2
illustrated by noting that heroin—despite its low prevalence and its being involved in the fewest
of the opiate/opioid-related deaths reported by DAWN—is still, in many metropolitan areas,
involved in more than 5 percent of drug-related deaths.
A treatment gap remains for opioid addicts (Kissen, et al., 2006). Admissions for primary
heroin abuse increased by 11% from 1995 – 2005, but planned medication-assisted therapy
decreased by almost 30% (SAMHSA, 2007). Studies have shown that the most effective way to
treat opioid dependence is with opioid agonist treatment, wherein the drug of abuse is replaced
with a similar opioid that prevents withdrawal symptoms and even the euphoric effects of the
drug of abuse (Mattick, 2009). Historically, licensed opioid treatment programs (OTPs), or
“methadone clinics”, have been the only source of this kind of effective treatment against opioid
dependence. Methadone maintenance works well (Ling & Wesson, 2003), but it is subject to
several drawbacks. First, it is time consuming, requiring patients to travel as frequently as daily
to methadone clinics where they received doses of methadone. This time cost is important to
patients seeking treatment (Borisova & Goodman, 2004). Secondly, methadone is a full-agonist
at µ-receptors, which means that patients can develop a dependence on methadone and that
methadone overdoses can be fatal. Thirdly, office-based treatment (as opposed to methadone
clinic treatment) brings in patients not usually seen in methadone clinics who are more likely to
be young, white and hepatitis-C negative (Sullivan, et al., 2005).
The Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA 1974) addressed the serious issue
of diversion of methadone by creating a complicated regulatory structure—allowing only
approved programs the ability to provide narcotic medications for drug addiction treatment. The
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000), however, allows physicians to receive a
waiver from these regulations for the purpose of prescribing and dispensing FDA-approved
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Schedule III, IV and V narcotic medications for treatment of opioid dependence. The only drugs
in these schedules that are approved by the FDA for the treatment of opioid dependence are
Subutex and Suboxone, sublingual high-dose preparations of buprenorphine. The federal
regulation of the use of methadone in OTPs remains unchanged by DATA 2000.
Buprenorphine is a partial agonist that produces a weaker opioid effect. Because of its
weaker opioid effect, it can be prescribed by a doctor and self-administered by patients, thus
eliminating most of the time cost associated with the use of methadone for treatment of opioid
dependence. Other potential benefits of buprenorphine include an easier withdrawal, a reduced
chance of fatal overdoses, and a lower likelihood of abuse by patients or diversion to abuse by
non-patients.
The provision of the waivers introduced by DATA 2000, by allowing office-based
physicians to treat opioid dependence with the use of buprenorphine, marks an historic turning
point in the treatment of opioid dependence in the U.S. The relative openness of the provision of
waivers (compared to the tight regulation under NATA 1974) also potentially brings into the
substance abuse treatment community many physicians not otherwise professionally concerned
with substance abuse treatment; any physician, regardless of their specialty or their practice
setting, can qualify for a waiver.
Complicating matters, however, is a 30-patient caseload maximum placed on officebased physicians treating opioid dependent patients with buprenorphine under such a waiver
(Stanton, et al., 2006). Originally, there was a 30-patient limit on physicians and group practices.
The restriction on group practices was removed in August 2005, so that the caseload maximum
limit is now a per-physician limit. The restrictions changed again at the very end of 2006 to
allow physicians to treat up to 100 patients once the physician has a year of experience and files
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a second notification with the DEA. This caseload max is central to the present study. OTPs may
use buprenorphine without a DATA 2000 waiver, and are thus not subject to the 30-patient or
100-patient limit. The purpose of this restriction is to curb diversion to abuse, which was the
intention of NATA 1974.
Though the effectiveness of and issues related to office-based treatment of opioid
dependence with buprenorphine have been explored in the substance abuse treatment literature,
there has not been any work in the field of economics to model and understand physician
behavior in this context, especially physician response to a caseload maximum. This study
attempts to provide some understanding.

1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study examines the behavior of office-based physicians using buprenorphine to treat
opioid dependence. This study seeks to explore whether physician differences reveal themselves
through different behaviors, specifically physician choices regarding the prescription of
buprenorphine to opioid dependent patients in the face of a caseload maximum. In particular,
physicians have to make a decision about whether to use buprenorphine only to help patients
discontinue the substance of abuse, or to keep the patient on buprenorphine indefinitely and
maintain a long-term relationship with the patient (“maintenance”). Many observable physician
differences may contribute to the physician’s choices over these two treatment paths.
Physicians become qualified to receive a waiver under DATA 2000 if they hold one of a
number of certifications related to addiction or if they complete an approved eight-hour training
course. The eight hours of training is likely to be the most attractive route for physicians not
otherwise professionally involved in the treatment of addiction. These training courses are
offered in person or electronically, via CD-ROM over the internet. On-line/CD-ROM-based
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training courses are offered by the American Society of Addiction Medicine and the American
Academy of Addiction Psychiatry for $175 and $189 respectively. There is no reason to believe
that this cost is in any way prohibitive for physicians. Furthermore, these training courses (both
in person and electronic) qualify for AMA PRA Category 1 Credit™—credit for continuing
medical education (CME) that many physicians earn as required by their state licensing boards,
medical specialties societies or boards, hospital staffs, or insurance groups.
Holding a board certification in addiction medicine, on the other hand, demonstrates a
professional commitment to the treatment of substance abuse. At the minimum, it can be
expected that the typical physician holding a board certification may approach the office-based
treatment of opioid dependence differently than the typical physician who received only eight
hours of online training.
The perceived benefit to physicians can also be affected by demographic characteristics.
Some physicians may consider it likely that they will encounter suitable opioid dependent
patients in need of treatment on a regular basis; others may consider this unlikely. In the face of a
caseload maximum, this likelihood could affect physician behavior.
Perceived costs may differ as well. Among physicians who do not specialize in addiction
medicine, differences in specialty may contribute to different choices regarding the treating of
opioid dependence with buprenorphine. Specialties differ by the amount of training involved,
average number of hours worked, average income earned, and the skills or temperament
required. Since specialty choice is endogenous, specialty choice should reveal differences among
physicians, and that these differences might also impact choices related to treatment of opioid
dependence. If it is the case that certain treatment paths are more time-intensive than others, or
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that certain treatment paths are more profitable than others, perceived opportunity costs (in terms
of forgone income and forgone leisure) will therefore also differ.
Physician practice setting can impact the costs of providing substance abuse treatment as
well. Some practice settings may be more or less appropriate for the treatment of drug-addicted
patients, due to the potential interaction with other patients, or due to proximity of appropriate
counseling and other non-pharmaceutical therapies opioid dependent patients may need in
addition to buprenorphine treatment.
This study considers the practicality of closing the treatment gap in opioid dependence by
allowing office-based non-addiction-specializing physicians to treat opioid dependence using
buprenorphine. It does not judge the appropriateness of such an approach—the substance abuse
community is best-suited for that evaluation and has consistently embraced the approach—but
rather to discover and explore differences in the ways that physicians respond to new treatment
(and potential profit) opportunities as well as the federal regulations that govern them.

1.3 FINDINGS
Following the introductory chapter, there are seven more chapters. Chapter 2 is a review
of the relevant literature on the treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine, including
the proper protocols for prescribing and dispensing buprenorphine. Absent any compelling
reason not to, the National Institutes of Health encourages physicians to treat opioid dependence
with buprenorphine using long-term maintenance, rather than withdrawing patients from
buprenorphine once stable. This chapter also covers the waiver process, and highlights the ease
with which physicians can become certified to prescribe buprenorphine, as well as the ease with
which physicians can increase their caseload maximum from 30 to 100.
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Chapter 3 is a review of the economic literature regarding physician behavior with a
particular focus on the topic of supplier-induced demand (SID), sometimes also called physicianinduced demand (PID). The present study avoids many of the pitfalls of previous studies that
incorporated supplier-induced demand, though making a case for or against the existence of
supplier-induced demand is not the focus of the present study.
The algebraic model is presented in Chapter 4. This model simplifies physician choice
with respect to treatment of opioid dependence to two decisions: the choice of a price/quantity
schedule for taking on new opioid dependent patients, and the choice of an optimal fraction of
those patients successfully stabilized who will undergo maintenance treatment. Kuhn-Tucker
conditions give rise to three experiments in particular: one related to the number of patients on
maintenance, one related to the number of non-maintenance patients, and one related to
differences brought about by the change in the caseload maximum in the total numbers of
patients.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the data: its sources, the characteristics of the sample, its
limitations and the methods used for variable creation. In Chapter 6, tests for heteroskedasticity
in the data and two approaches for dealing with it are also discussed.
The results of the empirical testing are discussed in Chapter 7. Three experiments are
done: one on the number of maintenance patients (Experiment #1), one on the number of nonmaintenance patients (Experiment #3), and one on the differences in the total numbers of patients
after a change in the caseload maximum (Experiment #2). In general, the results of the three
experiments confirm the predictions of the algebraic model presented in Chapter 4. Physician
specialty appears to reveal much about physician market power and opportunity costs.
Physicians in primary-care-type specialties (like internal medicine, family medicine and
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pediatrics) treat more patients than do physicians in other specialties. Physicians who are
certified in addiction medicine, report addiction medicine as a primary specialty or report
dedicating a high percentage of their practices to treating patients for substance abuse also treat
more patients, suggesting that they face lower opportunity costs. Practice setting appears to
reveal less about market power and opportunity cost, so there are only limited results that link
practice setting to physician treatment choices. The empirical results from Chapter 7
overwhelmingly support the result that physicians will treat more patients as a result of an
increase in the caseload maximum, but that this effect is stronger for maintenance.
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the study and its conclusions. The implications for
policy and for substance abuse treatment are discussed, and suggestions are made for further
research.
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CHAPTER 2: OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT WITH
BUPRENORPHINE
2.1 TREATMENT PROTOCOLS
The Office of Evaluation, Scientific Analysis and Synthesis of the CSAT publishes
Treatment Improvement Protocols (TIPs) to provide best practice guidelines for the treatment
of substance abuse. TIP 40, entitled “Clinical Guidelines for the Use of Buprenorphine in the
Treatment of Opioid Addiction” (CSAT 2004) offers recommendations on the use of
buprenorphine in clinical settings based on the experiences and the research of experts in the
field. This section will summarize the recommendations in the TIP that pertain to physician
choice within the scope of the current study.
Buprenorphine is currently commercially available in two medications: Subutex and
Suboxone. Both are sublingual tablets, and both come in 2mg and 8mg doses. Subutex is
buprenorphine only; Suboxone is four parts buprenorphine and one part naloxone. Naloxone
is added to make the abuse of Suboxone undesirable, as it should block the opioid effect of
the injection of crushed Suboxone tablets, and perhaps even precipitate withdrawal
symptoms. The combination of buprenorphine and naloxone is referred to generally as
“combination therapy,” though currently it only exists under the trade name Suboxone. The
CSAT recommends that combination therapy be used whenever possible, and only suggests
the use of “monotherapy” (buprenorphine alone) in a few cases, such as when the patient is a
pregnant woman.
The clinical use of buprenorphine to treat opioid dependence can involve the
following phases: tapering, wherein dosages of the opioid on which the patient is dependent
are reduced; induction, wherein the patient is first switched to buprenorphine; stabilization,
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wherein the patient is monitored to ensure the successful switch from the drug of abuse to
buprenorphine; maintenance, wherein other issues related to or arising from drug abuse (such
as psychosocial and family issues) are addressed; and dose reduction, where dosages of
buprenorphine are tapered until the patient finally discontinues the use of buprenorphine.
Exactly which of these phases treatment will actually involve hinges on two primary factors:
whether the patient is seeking to discontinue the use of a long-acting opioid (like methadone)
or a short-acting opioid (like heroin or Oxycodone), and whether the physician chooses to
withdraw the patient from buprenorphine after the patient is stabilized or to maintain the
patient on buprenorphine for an extended period of time.
For patients discontinuing the use of a long-acting opioid, such as methadone, they
must first taper their usual dose to no more than 30mg daily before they can be switched to
buprenorphine. This tapering is not necessary for a patient using a short-acting opioid; these
patients should simply discontinue use and be switched to buprenorphine1. If the physician
chooses to immediately withdraw a patient, there will be no maintenance phase. If the
physician chooses to use buprenorphine for long term maintenance, there may or may not be
a dose reduction phase, as some patients may stay on buprenorphine indefinitely. If a
patient’s doses of buprenorphine are reduced and the patient is taken off of buprenorphine,
this constitutes withdrawal, whether or not the patient had previously been maintained. Many
in the substance abuse treatment community use the word “detoxification” in place of
“withdrawal.” Table 2.1 summarizes the phases of treatment under the four possible
circumstances.

1

If a patient is discontinuing the use of a long-acting opioid, the physician is encouraged to use monotherapy
(Subutex) when initially switching the patient to buprenorphine, and then to use combination therapy
(Suboxone) as soon as possible thereafter; patients discontinuing short-acting opioids should only be treated
with combination therapy.
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In Chapter 4, the physician’s choices about the number of patients to take on and the
fraction to keep on maintenance will be the dependent variables. Regarding this choice, TIP
40 summarizes:
“The preponderance of research evidence and clinical experience, however,
indicates that opioid maintenance treatments have a much higher likelihood of longterm success than do any forms of withdrawal treatment. In any event, the immediate
goals in starting buprenorphine should be stabilization of the patient and abstinence
from illicit opioids, rather than any arbitrary or predetermined schedule of withdrawal
from the prescribed medication.”
Despite this warning about predetermined schedules, it is difficult to believe that
physician-specific differences such as specialty, practice setting, etc., will not at least in part
influence treatment choice.

Opioid of abuse

TABLE 2.1 – The phases of clinical treatment of opioid dependence with
buprenorphine.
Physician-determined treatment approach
Maintenance then
Maintenance
Withdrawal
Withdrawal
Longacting

Tapering, Induction,
Stabilization, and
Dose Reduction

Tapering, Induction,
Stabilization, Maintenance,
and Dose Reduction

Tapering, Induction,
Stabilization, and
Maintenance

Shortacting

Induction,
Stabilization, and
Dose Reduction

Induction, Stabilization,
Maintenance, and Dose
Reduction

Induction,
Stabilization, and
Maintenance

2.2 THE EFFICACY OF BUPRENORPHINE FOR TREATMENT OF OPIOID
DEPENDENCE
Many studies have confirmed the efficacy and safety of buprenorphine (Mello &
Mendelson, 1985; Walsh & Eisenberg, 2003; Ling, et al., 1998), even in outpatient and
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primary care settings (Fiellin, et al., 2006; Fedula, et al., 2003; Sohler, et al., 2010; Soeffing,
et al., 2009). With respect to retention and suppression of heroin use, it can be as effective as
methadone (Mattick, 2008). Both patients and physicians perceive buprenorphine to be
effective (Stanton, et al., 2006), and buprenorphine is significantly cheaper than methadone
treatment. French, et al. (2008) have shown that non-methadone outpatient treatment costs
$2,325 per treatment episode while methadone maintenance costs over 3 times as much.
Probably because of its cost-effectiveness and efficacy, there is significant interest in
prescribing buprenorphine, even among nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants (Roose,
et al., 2008).
Buprenorphine use in treatment of opioid dependence is not without downsides.
Among many physicians there still exists mistrust of substance-abusing patients, and there is
no standard for treating pain for opioid dependent patients (Merrill, et al., 2002). Financial
considerations also matter. Buprenorphine is excluded from 31% of insurance product
formularies, and is in the highest-cost tier in 55% of formularies (Horgan, et al., 2008).
Netherland, et al. (2009) have documented that training and reimbursement remain cromulent
sources of difficulty for physicians prescribing buprenorphine, as does access to counseling
services. Proper treatment in most cases requires maintenance and follow-up with other
counseling services (SAMHSA, 2004; Fiellin, et al., 2004).

2.3 CSAT WAIVERS
Title XXXV of the Children’s Health Act of 2000, otherwise known as The Drug
Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000), modified the Controlled Substances Act to
allow physicians to receive a waiver from the usual prohibition of the use of Schedule III, IV
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or V narcotics for the treatment of opioid dependence. Opioid treatment programs (OTPs) or
“methadone clinics” are regulated under the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, and do
not require additional permissions to use buprenorphine treatment to treat opioid dependence.
Only physicians outside of these or other tightly-regulated in-patient treatment facilities
require such a waiver.
In order to qualify for a waiver under DATA 2000, a physician (either an M.D. or
D.O.) must demonstrate necessary training, background or experience in addiction medicine
broadly or treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine specifically, demonstrate the
ability to refer opioid dependent patients to other psychosocial services (such as group or
individual therapy), and agree not to carry a caseload of patients being treated with
buprenorphine that exceeds a certain maximum, initially set at 30 patients and then increased
to 100 patients after one year of prescribing buprenorphine. The necessary training,
background or experience is demonstrated by one or more of the following:
•

The physician holds a subspecialty board certification in addiction psychology
from the American Board of Medical Specialties.

•

The physician holds an addiction treatment certification from the American
Society of Addiction Medicine.

•

The physician holds a subspecialty board certification in addiction medicine from
the American Osteopathic Association.

•

The physician participated as an investigator in one or more clinical trials which
led to the approval of a Schedule III, IV or V narcotic for the treatment of opioid
dependence.
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•

The physician has received other training or experience that is approved by that
physician’s state medical licensing board or the Department of Health and Human
Services.

•

The physician has completed at least eight hours of approved training in the
treatment and management of opioid addicted patients2.

A physician seeking a waiver first notifies the Secretary of Health and Human
Services of intent to treat patients with buprenorphine. The notification form can be
completed and submitted online or faxed or mailed in. The recipient of this notification
within the Department of Health and Human Services is the Division of Pharmacologic
Therapies (DPT) within the Center for Substance Abuse (CSAT) within the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). After receiving this notification,
CSAT reviews the notification and determines whether the physician meets the criteria for a
waiver then notifies the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the physician is qualified.
The DEA issues to the physician a unique identification number indicating the physician’s
qualifications. (These waivers are often referred to as “CSAT waivers.”)
In late 2006, Title XI of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization
Act further amended the Controlled Substances Act by granting physicians the opportunity to
seek permission to treat up to 100 patients, so long as the physician currently has a CSAT
waiver and it has been one year since they filed their initial notification with CSAT. In order
to increase the patient limit, a physician files a second notification with CSAT indicating
intent to treat up to 100 patients. Because the requirements for the patient caseload increase

2

Approved training can be provided by the American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, the American Medical
Association, the American Osteopathic Academy of Addiction Medicine, the American Psychiatric Association,
the American Society of Addiction Medicine, or other organizations approved by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
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are simple and easily understandable, the submission of a second notification permits the
physician to begin treating more patients; the physician does not need to wait for CSAT
confirmation. Physician response to an increase in the allowable patient caseload maximum
is a primary focus of this study.
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CHAPTER 3: PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR AND SUPPLIER-INDUCED
DEMAND
3.1 PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR
The data presented in Chapter 5 and analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7 provide the ability to
compare physicians along several important dimensions, including primary specialty and
practice setting. This section will provide a brief review of the literature with respect to these
important physician-level variables.
The issue of physician specialty has been studied extensively in the literature. The four
variables that are most usually analyzed in relation to specialty choice are educational
indebtedness, specialty potential earnings, years of graduate medical education required and
number of work hours. Bazzoli (1985) showed that educational indebtedness can affect specialty
choice, but that the impact is modest. It could be that physicians address the issue of educational
indebtedness through other labor market decisions, like the decision to moonlight while in
residency (Culler and Bazzoli, 1985).
There is a general consensus in the literature that the effect of potential earnings on
likelihood of specialty choice is positive but modest. Hadley (1977) failed to find an impact at
all, but Bazzoli (1985) and Sloan (1970) found a small but statistically significant effect from
income, such that physicians were more likely to choose specialties that offered higher potential
earnings. McKay (1990) showed that the percent of residents in a specialty increased less-thanproportionately when relative earnings for that specialty increased. When examining the variance
in recent trends (from late 1990s to early 2000s) in specialty choice, Dorsey et al. (2003) found
that income explained only 9% of the overall variability.
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The literature fails to find a consistent effect from the number of years of graduate
medical education required in a specialty. McKay (1990) found that length of training did not
matter, and Dorsey et al. (2003) found that years of required education explained 0.3% of the
variability in recent trends in physician choice—but in the counterintuitive direction. Physicians
appeared to have a preference for specialties that required 4 or more years of graduate medical
education, even after controlling for income.
Dorsey et al. (2003) also found, somewhat surprisingly, that number of expected work
hours explained 1% of the variability in specialty choice, with physicians demonstrating a
preference for specialties with more work hours (even after controlling for income). McKay
(1990) found, however, the contrary result: that the percentage of residents choosing a particular
specialty increases more than proportionately when the relative number of hours worked
decreases.
The study by Dorsey et al. also identified another variable useful in distinguishing
specialties: controllable lifestyle. Fifty-five percent of the variability in trends in specialty choice
was explained by physicians revealing a preference for a controllable lifestyle. Despite the
inconsistent nature of some of these results, two general conclusions emerge: physician specialty
choice is endogenous, and reflects careful consideration by residents and medical school students
of many variables; potential income explains some, but certainly not all, of a physician’s choice
of medical specialty.
The fact that non-pecuniary considerations are important factors in the choice of specialty
is underscored by the results of Burstein and Cromwell’s (1985) study on the rates of return from
training of U.S. physicians. They found that the pediatricians in their study received negative real

18
rates of return from their specialty training. The fact that physicians chose a specialty with a
negative rate of return suggests that lifestyle or other considerations are important.
Physician specialty may also reveal something about the market structure in which the
physician operates, which will be an issue in the discussion in the next section of demand
inducement. Wong (1996) showed that the market for many physician services was likely to be
monopolistically competitive, but that the reliability of that result depended on the specialty
under investigation. That conclusion held well for primary care physician services, as well as the
markets for general and family practice services and general surgery. For internal medicine, the
results were less conclusive, though monopoly structure was successfully ruled out. After
adjusting his model to correct some empirical problems, Wong found stronger evidence that the
market for internal medicine is likely characterized by monopolistic competition, but with
“informational confusion,” whereby rising physician supply increases search costs, which put net
upward, not downward, pressure on prices. So in addition to providing some information about
the physician, specialty also provides information about the market structure in which the
physician’s practice operates.
David and Neuman (2011) have recently explored the division of labor among physicians
between different practice settings. Their findings indicate that when physicians have the ability
to split patients between different practice settings, that decision hinges on considerations such as
the complexity of the patient’s case, the risk of serious complication, and the distance of the
practice setting from a hospital. The important implication for the model discussed in Chapter 4
is that physician practice setting is also a part of the bundle of a priori physician choices that bear
on the physician’s decisions about treating patients. Further, the authors point out that this can
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result in cream-skimming, whereby low-risk patients are moved from hospital settings and into
other separated practice settings, leaving hospitals with higher risk (and higher cost) patients.
The final physician-specific variable of interest is board certification. Wilensky and
Rossiter (1983) showed that board eligibility raised incomes on average by $8,000 per year,
while board certification raised incomes on average by $13,000. The differential effect of board
certification versus board eligibility is interpreted by the authors as reflecting differences such as
improved referrals and staffing privileges, and not simply the result of procedure-specific
training.

3.2 SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND
The model presented in Chapter 4 assumes that the physician faces a downward-sloping
demand curve for detoxification treatment and then induces demand for follow-up, or
maintenance, treatment. Supplier-induced demand (SID) is a controversial topic, and special
attention is given to it here. The recognition of the phenomenon is generally traced back to Evans
(1974) who observed that physician incomes in British Columbia did not vary the way that
physician supply did. Evans concluded that physicians must be adjusting their treatment intensity
in order to prevent income from changing, even if patient caseloads did change.
In this section, a summary of the current literature on SID will be presented, starting first
with the various definitions of SID, then moving on to the findings of the SID literature; the next
section presents the assumptions of the model presented in Chapter 4 in light of the discussion of
SID in this chapter.
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3.2.1 DEFINING SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND
The definition of SID is important because it has serious economic implications. The
ability of physicians to influence the demand for the medical services they produce has a twofold
origin: information asymmetry and third-party payment. It is information asymmetry that makes
demand inducement possible. Most patients do not have the medical expertise to appraise the
necessity of certain medical treatments. In this way, the physician/patient relationship can be
modeled much like the mechanic/customer relationship and other professional services
agent/principal relationships. The agent offers a recommendation to the principal who must
assess how well the agent’s goals line up with his or her own goals and the likelihood that the
recommendation is a good one, given the constraints on the agent such as the costs of making
spurious recommendations (e.g., bad reputation). The presence of third-party payers exacerbates
this problem, however, by reducing the cost to patients of allowing themselves to be induced into
purchasing something they do not need.
Generally, SID is modeled as imperfect agency on the part of the physician. The
physician engages in SID when he or she recommends medical care that has a marginal health
benefit that is lower than its marginal cost only because the impact on physician net income is
positive. The exact nature of this process is described differently by different researchers. Some
model SID as a game of cheap talk (Calcott, 1999; De Jaegher and Jegers, 2001); others consider
the possibility of fraud on the part of the physician (Wolinsky, 1993); still others describe it as a
physician’s rational participation in the patient’s search process (Rochaix, 1989). Ellis and
McGuire (1990) have pointed out that third-party payment schemes can often cause quantity
demanded and quantity supplied to differ, and the actual amount of medical care provided in the
market is a function of the relative bargaining power of patient and physician. SID in this case is
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simply an expression of the physician’s relative bargaining power. Data that indicate the
patient’s relative bargaining power are generally not available.
The nature of the SID is likewise defined differently by different researchers. Some have
focused on visit intensity (Delattre and Dormont, 2003), while others have focused on physicianinitiated (as opposed to patient-initiated) visits (Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983; Grytten, et al.,
1995). Most of the literature takes a negative view of the practice of demand inducement by
assuming that the induced treatment is known by the physician to be unnecessary or unhelpful.
Reinhardt (1985) asserts that the suggestion that demand inducement will be in the long run fully
exploited if the possibilities for it are finite amounts to a claim that physicians are without
conscience. The point is that SID is such shameful behavior that only the conscience-less would
fully exploit it. Richardson (2001) interestingly points out that the provision of more care may
be, in some cases, provision of better care in the mind of the physician, who is trained in many
cases to believe that more care is better. Typical workload constraints prevent the provision of
more intense care, but shrinking caseloads—perhaps in response to increases in physician
supply—provide the physician with sufficient time to provide more intense care. Finally, Carlsen
and Grytten (2000) conclude that SID, if it does exist, does not pose a problem because it leads
to greater patient satisfaction. If the demand curve for physician services is shifted outward (even
through demand inducement), then consumer surplus is higher.
The definition of SID that is employed in the model presented in the next chapter is a
simple one: supplier-induced demand represents the physician’s ability, through whatever means,
to convince a patient to receive treatment of a specific type—or to deny a patient treatment of a
specific type—without losing that patient as a customer for other types of care.
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3.2.2 FINDING SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND
Attempts to identify SID empirically have generated mixed results. Many studies have
supported the existence of SID (Folmer and Westerhout, 2008; Melichar, 2009; Schaafsma,
1994; Carlsen and Grytten, 2000; Delattre and Dormont, 2003; Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983b),
and many studies have not (Feldman and Sloan, 1988; Carlsen and Grytten, 1998; Hay and
Leahy, 1982).
Part of the reason for the inconsistency of the results of SID studies is that it is not
entirely clear what impact SID ought to have on the modeling of physician behavior or the
equilibrium conditions. If demand inducement is expressed as a limited ability to shift the
demand curve, then the demand curve still constrains price and quantity (albeit at a higher level
of each), and the physician behaves just as before. If demand inducement is expressed as an
unbounded ability to shift the demand curve, then price will always be infinity and so will
quantity, unless inducement is costly. In the case of costly inducement, the physician is trading
away the normal demand-curve constraint on price and quantity for an additional component in
the cost function. This modeling would certainly be different, but it is not clear whether or how
these differences would manifest themselves in ways observable by the econometrician.
Based on Evans’ (1974) observation that physician incomes could be more stable than
physician supply in a particular market, the most common tests for the existence of SID have
analyzed physician response to an increase in the local supply of physicians (Peacock and
Richardson, 2007; Delattre and Dormont, 2003; Carlsen and Grytten, 2000; Wilensky and
Rossiter, 1983b; Richardson, 2001). It is reasoned that if the local supply of physicians (or
physician services) increases, prices and profits would tend to fall. In order to combat this
reduction in profit, physicians respond by inducing demand for services, so that patient treatment
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becomes more intensive. This increase in services per patient offsets the reduction in price so
physician profits are at least in part preserved.
This approach is subject to criticism. Much of the criticism in the literature focuses on the
ambiguous econometrics, such as the identification problem discussed by Auster and Oaxaca
(1981) and dismissed by Peacock and Richardson (2007), who claim that including the quantity
of physicians in the demand function does not cause an identification problem if the supply
variable is quantity of services provided, not physician quantity. Phelps (1986) also pointed out
the important difference between the supply of physicians and the supply of the physician-firm
output. However, other criticisms exist.
One such criticism is that an increase in physician supply in a particular market is
unlikely to be exogenous. Rather, it is likely that physician supply might increase in a particular
market in response to profit opportunities. This presents a dilemma, however, because it requires
that physicians are willing to increase their treatment intensity in response to falling prices, but
unwilling to exploit pre-existing profit opportunities.
One potential explanation is that physicians in the local market are earning only a normal
rate of return, so that when prices fall even marginally, they suffer losses which can be offset
through demand inducement activities. This deepens the paradox, because a normal rate of return
would be expected in a competitive market for physician services, but Stano (1985 and 1987) has
pointed out that market power is a necessary pre-condition to the ability to induce demand. The
so-called target income hypothesis (TIH) (Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1996) might be able to
reconcile normal rates of return with market power, but as is implied above, a positive physician
supply shock is unlikely to occur where rates of return are normal.
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The only theoretical formulation that reconciles these difficulties is one that combines
TIH with low-but-positive profit targets for physicians who have some market power. The
positive profits are sufficient to explain entry; and TIH is sufficient to explain the physician
response to that entry. Market power is necessary to explain how a physician’s target level of
profits could be positive. One implication of this theoretical formulation is that the market
structure is monopolistically competitive—which is what Wong (1996) found—because of the
existence of both market power and prices that fall in response to entry. TIH itself has been
questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds, however (McGuire and Pauly, 1991).
The process of inducement in the standard approach to studying inducement is also not
well-developed. Some important questions often remain unanswered, such as: How often can
physicians increase visit intensity through inducement—every time there is an increase in
physician supply, or only a finite number of times? If physicians can only induce demand only a
finite number of times, in the long run all inducements will have taken place and it is not clear
that the researcher should be able to identify instances of inducement. On the other hand, it is
difficult to believe that inducement opportunities are infinite because there must exist some
upper bound on visit intensity.
If within the relevant decision-making range there always exists unexploited possibilities
for further inducement, demand inducement could become routine. A physician with an income
target, for example, could reach that target by providing services to a mix of induced and uninduced demanders. For the researcher, separating routine inducement from strategic inducement
would prove both theoretically and econometrically cumbersome.
One response to the question of whether inducement can be routine for a physician with a
target income is to assume that inducement is costly: either monetarily (Stano, 1985 and 1987) or
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in terms of physician utility (Folmer and Westerhout, 2008). The cost or disutility element may
untangle inducement from routine physician behavior, but it does not do so without raising other
issues. For example, the standard model for researching SID is one in which physicians induce
demand in response to increases in physician supply, but it is difficult to reconcile inducement
that is too costly to be a routine part of physician practice with inducement that is a cost-effective
solution to recovering revenues lost in the face of falling prices.
Models in which physicians suddenly shift to the otherwise-avoided practice of
inducement in response to an exogenous increase in physician supply are not theoretically
rigorous enough to be empirically useful. Even when they do find support for SID, Freebairn
(2002) points out that these studies are faulty because the positive correlation between the
physician-population ratio and the supply of services could reflect an availability problem. When
the physician-population ratio increases, increased availability reduces the full price of medical
services for patients, so that the quantity demanded rises.
Some researchers have attempted to overcome these difficulties by examining other
market shifts that lead to more tractable results. Schaafsma (1994) points out that in the case of
no SID, supply shifts will lead to similar estimates of demand elasticity regardless of the source
of the shift, but under conditions of SID, the cause of the supply shift will impact the estimated
demand elasticity. Stano (1987) discusses the role of competition in SID, pointing out that
inducement will not be possible under highly competitive market conditions.
Another approach in the literature is to focus on the patient being induced to treatment.
Given that a physician chooses to engage in a profit-maximizing level of demand inducement,
the physician may discover that some patients are more subject to demand inducement than are
others. This literature looks at medical care usage rates of patients by characteristics thought to
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be related to susceptibility to inducement. However, this approach leads to endogeneity problems
because differences in medical care usage may be related either to differences in susceptibility to
inducement or to the characteristics by which patients were separated. Researchers often lack the
ability to observe variables correlated with susceptibility to inducement but uncorrelated with
medical care demand.
Hay and Leahy (1982) show that medical professionals are at least as likely to utilize care
as other patients. They argue that medical professionals are less likely to be susceptible to
inducement; if physicians were inducing demand, they would target patients who were not
medical professionals, so the pattern of medical care utilization ought to be reversed. Calcott
(1999) points out that medically-informed patients may seek advice more often when symptoms
(which they understand) are present. Poorly-informed patients may also underestimate the
meaning of negative test results.
Other studies of SID have focused on physician responses to fee changes (Folmer and
Westerhout, 2008; Feldman and Sloan, 1988; Melichar, 2009). Still others have used gametheoretic, search or bargaining frameworks to model SID (De Jaegher and Jegers, 2001;
Dranove, 1988; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Wolinksy, 1993; Rochaix, 1989).

3.3 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The fact that SID is inherently difficult to discover empirically does not mean that it
should be abandoned. There are responsible ways and important reasons to include SID in
models of physician behavior. Inducing demand is possible for physicians because of the
presence of third-party payers and asymmetric information. When employed correctly, it can

27
improve profits. Whether the physician is modeled as a utility-maximizing individual or the
owner of a profit-maximizing firm, the physician will appreciate higher income.
The model presented in Chapter 4 will assume that the physician’s practice maximizes
profits. A physician will be able to achieve higher levels of utility with more income, all else
equal, as a rational utility-maximizer. Profit maximization is not inconsistent with utility
maximization. Variables with different effects on utility and profit (such as time spent at work)
are considered as part of a physician’s prior decisions, such as choice of medical specialty and
whether or not to induce demand. Stated differently, the physician modeled in Chapter 4 will
attempt to maximize profit given an a priori choice about whether (and to what degree) to engage
in SID. The decision about whether to engage in SID may change the structure of the physician’s
profit function, but not the physician’s optimization problem, given that function.
The model presented in Chapter 4 will also assume that the physician’s profit can be
influenced by the amount of inducement activity undertaken by the physician. Rather than
inducing patients to necessarily receive more or more intense care, as is done in many of the SID
studies, the physician modeled in the next chapter will decide whether or not to establish a longterm relationship with a patient. Therefore, the possible “inducement” can be positive or
negative; the physician induces the patient to accept a long-term relationship if it is profitmaximizing to do so and induces the patient to reject a long-term relationship if it is profitmaximizing to do so. In this way, the model presented in Chapter 4 avoids some of the issues of
unobservable visit intensity and unobservable patient expectations.
The physician’s inducement activity in the next chapter is subject to a three-fold
constraint. First, as is assumed in many of the SID studies, Chapter 4 will assume that the
inducement-related treatment in question is costly to provide. However, the model does not
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specify whether those costs are costs of inducement activity, or rather the usual costs of
providing treatment to patients. In this way, the model of Chapter 4 avoids this issue. Second,
because the “maintained” long-term relationship is the treatment subject to inducement, the
model in the next chapter implies that inducement activity is limited to the finite sample of
patients with whom the physician has an un-induced short-term relationship governed by the
forces of supply and demand. The third constraint is a literal one: as discussed in Chapter 2,
physicians treating patients for opioid dependence with buprenorphine are subject to caseload
maximums set by federal law. Taken together, these three constraints allow the model in Chapter
4 to explain why physicians may engage in some, but not complete, inducement.
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CHAPTER 4: THE MODEL
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The current study focuses on different approaches that a physician may take with
patients. The categories considered in this study are “maintenance” patients—those patients
successfully stabilized on buprenorphine and whom the physician has decided to maintain on
buprenorphine—and “non-maintenance” patients. Non-maintenance patients can be patients in
any of three possible phases of treatment (see Table 2.1): induction3, stabilization or dose
reduction. Therefore, some of a physician’s non-maintenance patients will be those new patients
still in the process of switching from a substance of abuse to buprenorphine (induction and
stabilization). Other non-maintenance patients will be those the physician has decided to
withdraw (or detoxify) and so are in the dose-reduction phase of treatment. After the patient has
been successfully introduced to buprenorphine and stabilized, the physician can choose whether
to keep the patient on buprenorphine indefinitely (“maintenance”) or to taper the doses of
buprenorphine until the patient is withdrawn from it as well.
It is assumed that demand for buprenorphine treatment is entirely patient-initiated and uninduced. This is justifiable for several reasons. First, only patients dependent on opioids are
potential candidates for treatment, and it is unlikely that physicians will have much knowledge of
a patient’s opioid abuse except for when the patient is seeking treatment or if the patient is
already in the physician’s care.

Also, the physicians in the sample are not all dedicated

substance abuse specialists, so their ability to search for opioid dependent patients to induce into
receiving treatment is limited. Finally, the decision to discontinue opioids must originate with the

3

The reader should be careful to avoid confusing inducement, such as demand inducement (discussed in Chapter 3),
with induction, which refers to the initial doses of buprenorphine that a patient receives after having just recently
discontinued the substance of abuse.
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abuser, although the environment of family, friends and criminal justice entities can exert
pressure.
The model treats the decision regarding maintenance treatment as being entirely
physician-determined and profit-focused. There may be un-induced exogenous patient demand
for maintenance treatment, but the decision rests with the physician. In the model, if a patient
does not want to be maintained on buprenorphine, the physician has the ability to induce (or
coerce) the patient to receive it; if a patient wants maintenance treatment, the physician has the
ability to deny it without losing the patient as a substance abuse treatment patient.
The physician in the model is a profit-maximizer who faces a downward-sloping demand
curve for treatment of opioid dependence with buprenorphine. The physician chooses both what
quantity of buprenorphine treatment (induction and stabilization) to supply to the market and
what fraction of those patients successfully stabilized to induce to maintenance treatment. The
first choice variable is constrained by the demand curve; the second choice variable is
constrained between 0 and 1. In addition to the profit goal and the costs associated with
buprenorphine treatment, maintenance treatment and inducement activities, the pair of choice
variables together is constrained by a legally-imposed caseload maximum to which the physician
is subject.
There are two time periods under consideration. In the first time period, the physician
will take on new patients and treat them through the induction and stabilization phases of
treatment, since patients must first be successfully stabilized before being maintained. In the
second time period, the physician will again take on some new induction and stabilization
patients, but may have also placed some fraction of the patients successfully stabilized on
maintenance treatment.

31
The model makes some additional simplifying assumptions. The model assumes that
stabilization is always successful. In reality, the physician has as potential maintenance patients
only those patients who are successfully stabilized on buprenorphine. Of course, if there is an
exogenous failure rate, then the model can be thought of as incorporating that failure rate into the
physician’s choice for the fraction of patients to maintain, so the impact on the model should be
minimal.
The model also assumes that there is no discount rate. Since it is only a two-period
model, the discount rate would not have that great an impact anyway, especially when one
considers that physicians, given the time spent in school and residency, are unlikely to be very
myopic. If the model were extended to include additional periods (or infinite periods, which
would be the most likely extension), a discount rate would be necessary. The absence of a
discount rate would not significantly alter the results obtained from the model.
Finally, the model assumes that any patients who are withdrawn (or detoxified) are
withdrawn within the first time period. Because it is only a two-period model, the “Maintenance
then Withdrawal” treatment path from Table 2.1 is not possible. Induction and stabilization take
at least one period of time in the present model. So any patients to be maintained will be
maintained only in the second period. If those patients are to be later withdrawn, that would
happen in a third period, which the model does not consider. In summary, in the first period of
the model, all patients are new patients, experiencing induction to buprenorphine and
stabilization. Some of those patients also experience dose reduction in that first time period; the
rest return in the second time period as maintenance patients. In the second time period, the
physician also begins again with another set of new patients.
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4.2 THE ALGEBRAIC MODEL
The physician chooses to provide buprenorphine treatment to q new patients in each
period. Demand for buprenorphine treatment is given by the inverse demand function P = p(q)
with PQ < 0 and PQQ ≥ 0. Of those q patients treated in one period, the physician induces a
fraction y of them to receive maintenance treatment in the next period, such that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. The
price that the physician receives from maintenance is proportional to and less than the price of
induction and stabilization treatment, because it is less intense. The variable r gives the ratio of
the maintenance price to the induction and stabilization price, such that 0 < r < 1.4 The physician
is constrained to a maximum total caseload of X patients, so that X ≥ (1 + y) × q.
Revenue in the first period will include revenue only from new patients, q × p(q). In the
second time period, revenue again includes new patients but also includes revenue from induced
maintenance treatment, y × q × r × p(q). Therefore:
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Costs from both initial buprenorphine treatment and induced maintenance treatment
contain fixed and increasing marginal components. The fixed components are c0 and c1
respectively. The variable component for initial induction and stabilization treatment is γ(q). The
cost of maintenance treatment is increasing in the number of maintained patients, m = q × y, and
is equal to ψ(m) with ψQ = yψM and ψY = qψM, where ψM is the first derivative of ψ with respect
to the total number of patients on maintenance. The cost of maintenance includes not just any
material and labor costs (also included in the cost of induction and stabilization), but also any
cost associated with establishing necessary relationships with providers of additional counseling

4

For physicians paid under capitation, the prices would be equal and r would equal 1.

33
and other necessary follow-up treatment as well as any possible cost associated with inducing the
patient to maintenance. If there exist costs from inducing patients away from maintenance (i.e.,
convincing patients that do not need it), then this would put downward pressure on ψM, but the
model implicitly assumes that this effect is not great enough to make ψM or ψMM negative. The
total cost function is:
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Combining the fixed cost components gives:
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Profit is total revenue minus total cost:
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The physician’s problem is to maximize profit subject to the caseload constraint
mentioned earlier.
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The Lagrangian is:
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The first order conditions are:
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4.3 KUHN-TUCKER CONDITIONS
Because of the inequality constraint, it is appropriate to use Kuhn-Tucker (KT)
conditions (Kuhn & Tucker, 1951) to determine the possible solutions for q and y. The KuhnTucker conditions are:
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The KT conditions, combined with the definitions of q and y, give rise to eight total
possibilities for solutions for q, y and the impact of the caseload maximum X, which are
summarized in the table below. If λ 5 0, equations (11) and (8) imply that the caseload
maximum is binding.
TABLE 4.1 – The eight possibilities based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
Possibility

Constraint on q

Constraint on y

Caseload maximum

1

q≥0

0≤y≤1

X ≥ q(1 + y)

2

q≥0

0≤y≤1

X = q(1 + y)

3

q≥0

y=0

X ≥ q(1 + y)

4

q≥0

y=0

X = q(1 + y)

5

q=0

0≤y≤1

X ≥ q(1 + y)

6

q=0

0≤y≤1

X = q(1 + y)

7

q=0

y=0

X ≥ q(1 + y)

8

q=0

y=0

X = q(1 + y)

Possibilities #5 – #8 all involve a solution of 0 for q. If the physician chooses to treat 0
patients for opioid dependence then, regardless of the choice of y, the physician will also
maintain 0 patients. This solution is uninteresting.
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Possibilities #3 and #4 from Table 4.1 allow for non-zero solutions for q but force
solutions of 0 for y. This means that the physician chooses only to treat patients for induction and
stabilization and then immediately initiates does reduction, never placing patients on a
maintenance regimen. This is an interesting subset of physician solutions to the problem, but in
the case of Possibility #4, it is not also mathematically interesting. In Possibility #4, the caseload
maximum binds. This means that the physician chooses to treat the maximum number of patients
and never maintains any; q = X. This will not lead to any testable hypotheses. Possibility #3,
however, will. In this case, the physician chooses not to maintain any patients but also has excess
caseload capacity. Specific solutions are discussed in the next section.
In Possibilities #1 and #2 from Table 4.1, the solution can involve nonzero solutions for
both q and y, which makes them empirically interesting. These possibilities are additionally
interesting when viewed in light of ongoing philosophical differences within the substance abuse
treatment community. Some believe strongly in long-term medical maintenance in the treatment
of opioid dependence, while others believe strongly that the goal for the substance-abusing
patient ought to be complete independence from narcotics, including medications like
buprenorphine. If these positions hold strongly enough, then even given profit considerations, it
should be expected that physicians of the first type will choose y = 1 and eventually have an
entire caseload of only patients on maintenance and physicians of the second type will choose y
= 0 and never keep any patients on maintenance. Possibilities #1 and #2 concern physicians who
choose a mixture of the two approaches. If strict ideology is not driving a physician’s choice of
treatment style, then one challenge to the assumption of profit-maximization behavior among
physicians is weakened.
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In summary, of the eight possible outcomes implied by the KT conditions necessary to
solve the physician’s profit-maximization problem subject to an inequality constraint, this study
will explore only the first three given in Table 4.1.

4.4 RESULTS
The results implied by the first three possibilities from Table 4.1 are explored in the three
subsections that follow. Each possibility yields results that apply to a specific subset of
physicians or observations in the data. The data and the subsample creation are covered in the
next two chapters.
4.4.1 POSSIBILITY ONE
Possibility #1 has non-zero solutions to q and y with a caseload that does not bind (λ = 0).
This means that equations (6) and (7) above are satisfied with equality to zero.
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Equation (13) can be solved for ψM and substituted into (12), which eliminates two terms:
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Because the caseload maximum is not binding, there is no other equation that can be used
to find exact solutions for q and y. General solutions can be achieved from (14):
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The number of patients on maintenance treatment in period 2 (m) is equal to the product
of the number of patients stabilized in the first period (q) and the proportion of those patients
induced to maintenance (y): m = q × y. Using the results in (15), it can be seen that:
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This solution for m can be evaluated for comparative statics results. The following can be
confirmed5:
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where ED is the price elasticity of the demand for treatment of opioid dependence.
The first of these comparative statics results at first appears surprising, because it implies
that the greater the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and stabilization,
the fewer patients the physician would choose to place on maintenance. The key to
understanding this result is to recall that the caseload maximum does not bind in this case. The
physician intentionally chooses to treat fewer total patients than allowable. The marginal cost of
another patient on maintenance is always equal to the marginal revenue from another patient on
maintenance. Equation (13) shows that ψM = pr, and this condition eliminates most of the impact
of r on the first order conditions for q, except for the term qryPQ in (14). This term represents the
decrease in maintenance revenue that results from a one-unit increase in q, due to the fact that an
increase in q pushes down p. In other words, the greater is the value of r, the greater is the rate at
which the marginal revenue of maintenance falls as the number of patients treated increases. A
high r magnifies the negative price effect of an increase in the number of patients treated,
causing the physician to choose a lower value for q (new patients), which reduces m (patients
maintained).

5

The elasticity of demand (ED) for withdrawal treatment in this model is equal to p / (qPQ). Holding q constant, the
derivative of m with respect to ED is equal to the derivative of m with respect to p / PQ.
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An increase in the marginal cost of induction and stabilization γQ decreases the optimal
choice for the number of new patients q*, holding the choice for y constant, as should be
expected. All else equal, this will drive down the optimal solution for m.
Physicians with more market power face demand curves that are overall less price elastic,
which means that the value of the price elasticity of demand is higher, because it is less negative.
Therefore, the third inequality in (17) can be interpreted as saying that the derivative of m* with
respect to market power is negative; physicians with more market power will maintain fewer
patients, and physicians with less market power will maintain more patients.
The specific hypotheses based on these results are discussed in Section 4.5.
4.4.2 POSSIBILITY TWO
Possibility #2 allows for nonzero solutions for both q and y but, unlike in Possibility #1,
with a binding caseload maximum. The fact that the caseload maximum binds means that the
equation X = q(1 + y) can be added to equations (12) and (13) above and exact solutions for q
and y and m can be found.
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These three solutions can be evaluated for the impact of a change in the caseload
maximum, X:
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This means that the physician bound by the current caseload maximum would respond to
an increase in that caseload maximum by treating fewer new patients and keeping more patients
on maintenance.
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At first glance, the reason for this may not seem obvious. One might expect that profitmaximization should make the physician indifferent between an additional new patient or an
additional maintenance patient, but the results in (19) contradict this intuition. A hypothetical
example clarifies this result. Suppose a physician currently chooses to treat a certain number of
opioid dependent patients and to maintain a certain number of those patients, such that the sum
of the numbers of patients equals the caseload maximum, and the physician would rather have
treated more patients total had the physician not faced the caseload maximum. If the caseload
maximum is increased by 1, the physician can choose either to treat one more new patient or to
maintain a long-term relationship with one additional current patient. Under what conditions will
a physician choose an additional new or an additional maintenance patient?
Keeping one more patient on maintenance will increase the physician’s costs by ψM.
Keeping one more patient on maintenance will increase the physician’s revenue by pr. So the
marginal profit of an additional maintenance patient is pr – ψM.
If the physician were to fill the hypothetical 1-patient increase in the caseload maximum
by treating a new patient (increasing q), then the costs would rise by γQ. The revenue change
caused by this increase in q has three components. The output effect on revenue of an increase in
q is p. The price effect on revenue of an increase in q is qPQ. This price effect of the increase in q
also applies to the price of maintenance. The price effect in that case is qryPQ. Therefore the
change in revenue from treating one additional new patient is p + qPQ + qryPQ.
The physician will prefer adding another maintenance patient to adding another new
patient so long as:
pr – ψM > p + qPQ + qryPQ – γQ

(20)
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The third term on the right-hand side of (20) represents the price effect of an increase in
initial induction and stabilization patients on the revenue earned from maintenance patients,
referred to from here on as the “cross-price effect.” The only way that the physician could prefer
to choose another new patient would be if the new-patient-specific difference between marginal
revenue and marginal cost was sufficiently greater than the difference between marginal revenue
and marginal cost for maintenance—i.e., large enough to make up for the cross-price effect.
However, had this been the case, the physician’s pre-caseload-increase mix of maintenance and
non-maintenance patients would have been inefficient, because treating more new patients, and
maintaining fewer of them, would have yielded higher profits.
A profit-maximizing physician for whom another new patient is marginally more
profitable—net of the negative cross-price effect—than another maintenance patient is not
feasible within the model. A reduction in the number of maintenance patients and an increase in
the number of new patients would have reduced the negative cross-price effect of an increase in
new patients, so further increases in non-maintenance patient counts (and reductions in
maintenance patient counts) would likewise have been profitable.
Stated differently, it is possible for the physician to respond to an increase in the caseload
maximum by deciding to keep one additional patient on maintenance rather than to treat another
new patient to avoid the negative cross-price effect, but it is not possible for a physician to
respond to an increase in the caseload maximum with a willingness to bear the negative crossprice effect of treating an additional new patient, because the tradeoff would have been even
more attractive prior to the caseload maximum increase, when treating one additional new
patient would have required reducing the number of patients on maintenance, thereby reducing
the negative cross-price effect.
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Another, simpler way, to interpret this result is to say that the caseload maximum, when it
binds and the physician treats both maintenance and non-maintenance patients, necessarily binds
on maintenance patients. Equation (7) can be used to confirm this result. Possibility #2 from
Table 4.1 constrains all of the first order conditions to be equal to zero. This causes λ* to take on
the value pr – ψM. The usual interpretation of λ* is that it represents the impact of a change in the
constraint on the value of the state variable, in this case profit. The expression pr – ψM is the
difference between the marginal revenue and marginal cost of an additional maintenance patient,
implying that a 1-unit change in the caseload maximum X leads only to a 1-unit change in the
number of patients on maintenance.
4.4.3 POSSIBILITY THREE
The third possibility that will be explored is the possibility that the physician chooses a
positive number of patients for induction and stabilization, but chooses not to maintain them,
while not reaching the caseload maximum: Possibility #3 from Table 4.1. Equation (6) from
above holds with equality to zero, and is simplified when y and λ are set to zero.
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Equation (21) can be solved to find the profit-maximizing value for q, the number of
patients treated:
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The only reason for y* to be equal to zero in the absence of a binding caseload would be
if the marginal cost of maintenance was always greater than the marginal revenue of
maintenance. This result, that pr ≤ ψM, can also be obtained if equation (7) is evaluated under this
set of KT conditions.
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Using the same definition of the price elasticity of demand for treatment of opioid
dependence from section 4.4.1 above, the following comparative statics are achieved:
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Again, the second result can be read as saying that the derivative of q* with respect to
“market power” is negative. Physicians with more market power with treat fewer patients;
physicians with less market power will treat more. The specific hypotheses based on these results
are discussed in the next section.

4.5 HYPOTHESES
The three possibilities discussed in Section 4.4 lead to three distinct empirical
experiments carried out in subsequent chapters. This section will summarize the hypotheses
generated by the quantitative results of the model.
4.5.1 EXPERIMENT ONE – MAINTENANCE PATIENTS
Based on the results derived in Section 4.4.1, the first experiment will focus on
physicians who choose positive values for both q and y, demonstrated by a positive number of
maintenance and non-maintenance patients, but who do not reach the maximum-allowable
caseload. The dependent variable in Experiment #1 will be the total number of patients currently
being maintained, m* = q* × y*.
It was shown in Section 4.4.1 that the total number of patients on maintenance was
negatively related to r (the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and
stabilization), γQ (the marginal cost of induction and stabilization treatment), and the price
elasticity of demand for treatment of opioid dependence.
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There are several variables available in the data that are related to these three parameters.
Physician specialty can be related to all three. Regarding specialty, the following hypotheses are
advanced:
•

Specialties with low market power (facing lower, i.e., more negative, demand
elasticity), such as internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics, ought to have
more patients on maintenance, relative to other specialties, all else equal.

•

Physicians specializing in psychiatry, a specialty wherein the physician is able to
capture more maintenance revenue through psychotherapy follow-up (r is higher),
ought to maintain fewer patients, relative to other specialties, all else equal.

•

Physicians who are certified addiction treatment specialists (or in general treat
more patients for addiction) and who therefore face lower marginal costs for
providing induction and stabilization treatment (both psychic and otherwise),
ought to have more patients on maintenance, relative to physicians lacking
addiction certification, all else equal.

Practice setting can also impact these parameters.
•

Physicians who practice in settings where there are other physicians may bear
higher marginal costs of induction and stabilization, due to a negative response of
the other physicians in the practice to the prospect of having opioid dependent
patients frequenting the premises. Physicians in single specialty group practices or
who practice in their own solo setting ought to maintain more patients, relative to
physicians in other settings, all else equal.

•

Physicians who practice in hospitals, however, due to the increased availability of
support from other types of staff (like security), may also face low marginal costs
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for treatment of opioid dependence, and ought to maintain more patients, relative
to physicians in other settings, all else equal.
•

Physicians who are part of an HMO are more likely to be paid based on
capitation, which would increase the value of r to 1; these physicians ought to
maintain fewer patients, relative to non-HMO patients, all else equal.

Additionally:
•

Physicians with more experience will face lower marginal costs of induction and
stabilization treatment and therefore ought to maintain more patients, relative to
less experienced physicians, all else equal.

The variable X, the caseload maximum, does not appear in the comparative statics results,
but the maximum caseload increase in reality is a large one—from 30 to 100. It is therefore also
hypothesized that physicians subject to the higher caseload maximum will maintain more
patients, all else equal. A marginal increase in the caseload maximum should have no impact on
the number of patients maintained, because the physicians in this case are not bound by the
maximum. However, this increase is not a marginal one and a physician not bound at 100 can
certainly treat more patients than a physician not bound at 30.
4.5.2 EXPERIMENT TWO – RESPONSE TO CASELOAD LIMIT INCREASE
Possibility #2 discussed in Section 4.4.2 concerned physicians who treat positive
numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance patients and who are bound by the caseload
maximum. The primary result from the model in this case was that an increase in the caseload
maximum ought to increase the number of patients on maintenance and decrease the number of
non-maintenance patients, all else equal.
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It can be seen from looking at the derivative of m* with respect to X in equation (19) that
the greater the value of the ratio of the price of maintenance to the price of induction and
stabilization, r, the greater the positive impact of an increase in the caseload maximum on the
number of patients on maintenance. Physicians who face a higher r (psychiatrists or physicians
in HMOs) will have a stronger tendency to maintain more patients after an increase in X, relative
to other patients, all else equal.
It is also hypothesized that the effects of an increase in the caseload maximum on the
numbers of patients induced, stabilized, and maintained will be even stronger for physicians
whose behavior is most likely to conform to the model of the profit-maximizing physician
presented here, specifically non-addition-specializing physicians whose treatment decisions are
less likely guided by ideology and more likely guided by profit maximization, as suggested in the
model.
4.5.3 EXPERIMENT THREE – NON-MAINTENANCE PATIENTS
Possibility #3, discussed in Section 4.4.3 dealt with physicians who maintain no patients,
while not bound by the caseload maximum. It is possible that physicians who choose not to
maintain patients do so because they are ideologically anti-maintenance. However, these
physicians are not bound by the caseload maximum—that is, they treat fewer patients than they
are legally allowed to treat. This makes a strict anti-maintenance and pro-withdrawal ideology
less likely, though not impossible.
The equations in (22) show that these physicians will treat fewer patients when the
marginal cost of induction and stabilization treatment is higher and when the physician’s market
power is greater. Connecting these results to variables available in the data provides the
following testable hypotheses:
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•

Physicians in specialties of the primary-care type (internal medicine, family
medicine, pediatrics) will treat more patients, relative to physicians in other
specialties, all else equal, because they have less market power and the
opportunity cost of treating a substance-abusing patient is lower.

•

Physicians in practice settings where costs of treatment are lower (solo practices,
single-specialty group practices or hospitals) will treat more patients, relative to
physicians in other practice settings, all else equal.

•

Physicians who are certified addiction specialists or who have significant
experience in addiction treatment will face lower marginal costs for induction and
stabilization and will therefore choose to treat more patients, relative to nonaddiction specialists, all else equal.

It is also further hypothesized that physicians subject to the higher 100-patient caseload
maximum will report having more non-maintenance patients than do physicians subject to the
lower 30-patient caseload maximum. The reasoning for this is the same as the reasoning
discussed in Section 4.5.1: a marginal change in X should not be expected to have any impact,
but a change from 30 to 100 cannot be considered marginal.
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CHAPTER 5: THE SURVEY DATA
5.1 THE PHYSICIAN SURVEY
As part of the FDA approval process for Subutex and Suboxone, Reckitt Benckiser
Pharmaceutical is required to conduct research to track diversion and abuse. The research
includes a quarterly survey of a random sample physicians certified to prescribe buprenorphine
to opioid dependent patients (herein referred to as the “Physician Survey”). Physicians are
compensated $100 for the time (about 15 – 20 minutes) that it takes to fill out the survey.
The Physician Survey has undergone changes since its first waves. Initially, the random
sample of physicians was drawn from the publicly-available CSAT list of physicians certified to
treat using buprenorphine, inclusion on which was voluntary. Starting in 2005, the sample was
drawn instead from the DEA’s list of all certified physicians, regardless of whether they had
opted to have their name listed on the public CSAT website.
Because the sample for each wave is a random sample from either the CSAT list or the
DEA list, many physicians appear in the data multiple times. The original complete sample has
10,873 observations over 29 survey waves from 6,739 unique physicians, with each physician
appearing an average of 1.6 times. The earliest survey responses were recorded in November of
2003; the most recent responses were recorded in October of 2010.
Most of the questions have remained unchanged in various iterations of the survey,
though some have changed slightly. Likewise, certain waves of the survey included additional
marketing questions of interest to Reckitt Benckiser but not necessary for FDA surveillance.
Access to most of the variables of the data was provided by CRS Associates, LLC, who
manages the survey. Salvatore di Menza and Dr. Cynthia Arfken were instrumental in securing
access and providing data. In Section 5.2, the variables used in the study are discussed. The next
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section briefly discusses some of the limitations encountered in the survey data. The last section
briefly discusses an additional source of data used in the study.

5.2 AVAILABLE VARIABLES
The empirical models for Chapters 6 and 7 make use of the following variables from the
Physician Survey. Appendix A gives the full text of the relevant questions from the Physician
Survey.
•

Physician Specialty – respondent chooses up to 3 primary specialties from a list of
23 choices.

•

Years Licensed to Practice Medicine – respondent indicates the whole number of
years for which he or she has been practicing medicine.

•

Addiction Certification – respondent can indicate that he or she holds any of three
possible addiction certifications, or can indicate that he or she holds no
certification in addiction medicine.

•

Practice Setting – respondent chooses one of eight choices that best describes the
setting in which he or she primarily practices.

•

Time Certified – respondent indicates the length of time for which he or she has
been certified to treat patients with buprenorphine by choosing the range into
which it falls.

•

Today’s Date – respondent indicates the date on which the survey was completed.

•

Percent of Practice Substance-Abusing – the respondent indicates the percentage
of his or her time is spent treating substance abusing patients by choosing the
range into which it falls.
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•

Total Current Buprenorphine Patients – depending on the survey wave, the
respondent indicates the total number of patients currently on buprenorphine by
indicating how many are on different formulations or brand names of
buprenorphine.

•

Patients in Phases of Treatment – respondent, in some waves, indicates the
number of patients on a “withdrawal regimen” or a “maintenance regimen”; in
other waves, the respondent indicates the number of patients in phases
“induction,” “maintenance,” and “dose reduction.”

•

Patients Turned Down – respondent indicates the number of patients that he or
she has had to turn down for treatment in the last 90 days because of the federal
patient caseload maximum.

In addition to these variables from the Survey instrument, the data set used also included
coded physician IDs so multiple observations can be linked by respondent, the respondent’s state
of residence, and the first three digits of the respondent’s zip code.

5.3 SURVEY DATA LIMITATIONS
The most important limitation of the data from the point of view of testing the hypotheses
generated by the algebraic model is that it does not record variables that correspond exactly to
the model. One of the model’s two choice variables is y, the fraction of successfully-stabilized
patients to place on maintenance treatment. The survey does not ask physicians what percentage
of their patients are eventually placed on maintenance, but rather the total number on
maintenance at the time that the survey is completed. In the simple specification of the model,
these are easily disentangled because it is only a two-period model. The physicians surveyed
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have, in most cases, been prescribing buprenorphine for multiple periods, so that observed
patient counts do not fully reveal y. Regardless of the actual rate at which a physician places
patients on maintenance, over time, the fraction of the caseload dedicated to maintenance
patients should converge to 1 if y is positive.
Fortunately, the results of the optimization problem provide results that can be evaluated
with respect to m, or q × y, the total number of patients on maintenance. Further experimentation
based on this model might be hampered by the inability to accurately calculate the fraction of
patients placed on maintenance.
Another very important limitation of the data is that it does not directly indicate, for each
observation, the caseload maximum that the physician faced at the time that the survey was
completed. Because the caseload maximum is particularly important to Experiment 2 this is a
significant limitation. The caseload maximum is also important to the other experiments where,
for example, unconstrained physicians who face a higher constraint will have higher patient
counts than unconstrained physicians who face lower constraints.
The final limitation of the data is one that is common to all survey data, and that is that it
is subject to respondent error. There are, for example, cases where the same physician reports in
different waves inconsistent answers for number of years practicing medicine—for example,
reporting fewer years practicing medicine in a later survey wave. This and other related issues
are covered in the next chapter.

5.4 SUPPLEMENTAL DEA LISTS
Through CRS Associates, LLC, access was provided to DEA lists of the physicians who
have filed secondary notification of their intent to treat up to 100 patients. Because certification
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must be renewed every three years, this data provide only the caseload maximum that the
physician will face at the time of the expiration of their current certification. In other words, a
date associated with a caseload limit of 100 in this data serves as an upper bound of the date on
which the physician filed the necessary second notification of the intent to treat up to 100
patients. This data will be used in Chapter 6 not to identify those physicians who face a caseload
maximum of 100, but rather to identify those who certainly do not face a caseload maximum of
100 because they fail to ever appear on this list with a caseload maximum of 100.
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CHAPTER 6: METHODS
6.1 SUBSAMPLE CREATION
The three experiments introduced in Section 4.3 all require unique subsamples of
physicians, based on the KT conditions that gave rise to them. Those three subsamples were
created from the same original sample, created as described below.
Originally, the 30-patient limit on physicians prescribing buprenorphine applied to the
total number of patients treated in the entire group. Therefore, large health care systems were
limited to treating 30 patients. This limit was amended in August 2005. In order to eliminate any
observations from physicians that may have faced this “group” limit, all of the observations from
waves 1 through 8 of the survey were deleted.
Where missing, states were manually filled in based on the first three digits of the zip
codes, as reported in the data, but one observation was deleted for possessing neither piece of
data. All observations with 0 or more than 4 reported “primary specialties” were deleted. There
were only 4 observations of this type.
The following process was used to determine the practice setting for observations that
failed to report a practice setting. The 102 observations for which practice setting was blank and
the physician did not appear elsewhere in the data were all deleted, because there would be no
basis for imputing the practice setting. For the rest of the observations with missing practice
settings, the associated physicians all appeared at least one other time in the data where practice
setting was indicated. If the physician ever reported “OTP” (“other type of practice”) as the
practice setting, then OTP was coded for all missing observations. Otherwise, the treatment
setting for the wave closest in wave number to the wave with the missing practice setting was
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used as the treatment setting. All observations with practice setting indicated as “OTP” were
deleted.
Several steps were taken to identify the caseload maximum faced by the physician at the
time of observation, an imputed variable labeled X_limit. First, for any physician not ever
appearing with a caseload of 100 on the supplemental list from the DEA, all observations were
coded as X_limit = 30. All observations that occurred prior to December 29, 2006 were coded as
X_limit = 30 because this is the date on which the amendment to DATA 2000 allowing
physicians to treat up to 100 patients went into effect.
Physician responses to the survey question about the length of time for which the
physician has been certified to prescribe buprenorphine (less than a year, 1 – 2 years, 3 – 4 years,
more than 4 years) were also used. Combining these question responses with the date of the
response, earliest and latest possible certification dates were calculated for each observation.
Then, these earliest and latest possible certification dates were averaged for each physician. If the
date on which an observation occurred exceeded the latest possible certification date by one year
or more, the observation was coded as X_limit = 100—since the requirements for the caseload
maximum of 100 require that the physician has been certified to prescribe buprenorphine for one
year—unless the observation had already been coded as X_limit = 30. If the date on which an
observation occurred was within one year of the earliest possible certification date, the
observation was coded as X_limit = 30.
After all of the preceding coding was done, any observations for which the date of
observation is more than one year greater than another observation for the same physician were
coded as X_limit = 100, unless the observation was already coded as X_limit = 30. Any
observations for which X_limit could not be imputed were deleted.
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Experiment #1 relates to those physicians who treat positive numbers of maintenance and
non-maintenance patients. In the algebraic model, “non-maintenance” could only mean new
patients; in reality, non-maintenance patients can also include patients that are in the process of
having doses of buprenorphine reduced to withdrawal, whether or not those patients were ever
on maintenance. The data is easily filtered for these two criteria. However, the KT conditions
related to Experiment #1 indicate that the caseload maximum does not necessarily bind, so the
subsample creation for Experiment #1 also requires determining which observations are
consistent with a non-binding constraint.
First, the numbers of patients on Subutex and on Suboxone were summed to determine
the relevant total number of current buprenorphine patients. In order to determine whether the
caseload was binding, this total was compared to the imputed value for the caseload maximum
faced at the time of observation (the variable X_limit discussed above). Physicians were
eliminated if the total number of current buprenorphine patients was equal to or exceeded this
imputed limit.
Further, observations wherein physicians reported turning away patients in the previous
90 days due to the caseload maximum were also eliminated. There are two reasons for this. First,
a physician might face exogenous shocks to patient numbers (if a patient moves or is jailed, for
example) that could cause fluctuations in the number of patients receiving care that do not
necessarily reflect the physician’s choices. If a physician usually treats exactly 100 patients, but
happens to be at a total of only 97 at the time the survey is completed, this physician ought to be
considered to be bound by the caseload maximum. Secondly, a caseload maximum can begin to
alter physician behavior even before it is reached. A physician with a 97-patient caseload is
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aware of how close she is to the caseload maximum, and that caseload maximum may bind even
if q + m < 100. The final sample size for Experiment #1 was 2,079 observations.
The construction of the subsample for Experiment #2 was the most complicated. Because
the results discussed in 4.5.3 concern how a caseload-constrained physician would respond to a
change in caseload, the appropriate subsample includes observations where the physician:
•

faces a caseload maximum of only 30 patients,

•

reports positive numbers of both maintenance and non-maintenance patients,

•

appears to be bound by the caseload maximum of 30 patients, and

•

appears later in the data facing a higher (100-patient) caseload maximum.

In order to accomplish this, the imputed caseload maximum faced at the time of
observation (the variable X_limit discussed above) was used to separate observations by the
caseload maximum faced at the time of observation. First, the observations for which the
imputed caseload maximum was equal to 30 were evaluated. Any of these observations where
either the number of maintenance patients or the number of non-maintenance patients was equal
to zero were deleted. Of these observations, only the observations where either the sum of the
number of maintenance and the number of non-maintenance patients was equal to 30 or the
physician reported having turned down patients in the previous 90 days were retained. The rest
were deleted.
Given the selection of the appropriate 30-patient-limit observations just described, the
data was further evaluated. Only physicians still appearing at least twice, with at least one
observation at each caseload limit, were retained. All observations associated with other
physicians were deleted. This led to the intermediate set of observations from the original data on
which the subsample for Experiment #2 was based. All possible pairings of a physician’s
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multiple observations were evaluated, and those that paired one observation with a caseload
maximum of 30 with one observation with a caseload maximum of 100 were retained. From
there, any pairs where the physician practice setting or physician specialty choices differed
between the two observations were eliminated. At this point, the final sample size of
observations for Experiment #2 (the number of “pairs” meeting the above criteria) was 80, due to
the many restrictions on the definition of the sample. For 75 of the 80 observation pairs, the first
observation occurred in 2006; for the other five, the first observation occurred in 2008 or 2009.
These five observations were eliminated, so that the final sample size was 75.
Experiment #3, related to the third possibility derived from the KT conditions from Table
4.1, considers observations wherein the physician chooses not to maintain any patients, while not
reaching the caseload maximum. The creation of this subsample is straightforward. Any
observations for which the number of patients on maintenance was non-zero were deleted. Then,
the imputed caseload maximum (the variable X_limit discussed above) was used to eliminate any
observations for which the total number of patients being treated was equal to the caseload
maximum of 30 or 100. Finally, any observations for which the physician reported having turned
patients away in the previous 90 days due to the caseload maximum were eliminated, even if the
number of patients treated was not exactly equal to the caseload maximum. The reasoning for
this is discussed above in the description of the Experiment #1 subsample. The final sample size
of observations for Experiment #3 was 259.

6.2 VARIABLE CREATION
The states indicated by the respondent—or coded based on the first three digits of the zip
code—were used to create “region” dummy variables based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s
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definition of the regions of the U.S., as follows6: Region_NE includes Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;
Region_MW includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; Region_S includes Delaware, Maryland,
District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas;
Region_W includes Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada,
Washington, Oregon, and California; Region_Pac includes Hawaii, Alaska and Guam;
Region_Car includes the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. In all of the regression models, the last
two region dummies were not included, so they can be thought of as one excluded
“Region_Other” variable.
Physicians who claimed to have primary specialties in internal medicine, family medicine
or pediatrics were combined, and a dummy variable Sp_PCPtype was created and coded equal to
1 for these physicians, because of the similarities of these physicians in terms of patient
relationships and market power.
A variable called Add_Cert was created to indicate if the physician at the time of
observation held a board certification in addiction medicine (1) or held no such certification (0).
In the survey, the physician is directed to “mark any of these certifications in addiction
medicine” currently held: American Board of Medical Specialties, American Society of
Addiction Medicine, American Osteopathic Association, or “Not certified in addiction
medicine.” If a physician chose any of the first three options, without choosing the fourth, that
observation was coded as Add_Cert = 1. If the physician chose the fourth option either by itself

6

The Census Bureau includes Hawaii and Alaska in the West Region and does not include Guam, Puerto Rico or the
Virgin Islands.
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or with the first or third option, that observation was coded as Add_Cert = 0. It is possible that
the physician misread the question and only responded positively to American Board of Medical
Specialties or American Osteopathic Association because of other non-addiction-medicine
certifications held. If a physician responded positively to holding a board certification from the
American Society of Addiction Medicine, the observation was coded as Add_Cert = 1, regardless
of whether the fourth choice was also chosen.

TABLE 6.1 – Average Date of Survey Completion by Wave
Wave

Average Date of Survey Completion

9

January 10, 2006

10

April 17, 2006

11

July 10, 2006

12

October 8, 2006

13

January 7, 2007

14

April 12, 2007

15

July 20, 2007

16

October 12, 2007

17

January 18, 2008

18

April 18, 2008

19

July 13, 2008

20

October 13, 2008

21

January 10, 2009

22

April 11, 2009

23

July 9, 2009

24

October 11, 2009

25

January 11, 2010

26

April 9, 2010

27

July 12, 2010

28

October 10, 2010
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For observations where the date of the response to the survey was missing, the average
date for responses from the same wave was entered. The dates of responses were converted to
serial numbers and then averaged. The average response dates for the survey waves are given in
Table 6.1.
Because there were a number of inconsistencies with respect to the amount of time for
which the physician has been practicing medicine, for each observation, the number of years
practicing was subtracted from the date of the observation to calculate an implied date that the
physician started practicing medicine (as if the true answer was the integer as reported). Then,
these implied start dates were converted to a serial number and averaged for each physician.
Then, the date of the response was compared to this average implied start date for medical
practice to construct the variable Yrs_Practicing.
Some variables were created specifically for Experiment #2. Because Experiment #2
requires looking at changes in the numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance patients given a
change in caseload maximum, differences in these patient counts were calculated for all possible
iso-physician, iso-practice-setting and iso-specialty combinations of one 30-patient-limit
observation and one 100-patient-limit observation. The following independent difference
variables were calculated: the elapsed number of years (not necessarily an integer) between the
two observations (Time_Diff), a dummy variable indicating whether the physician reported
turning down any positive number of patients in the second of the two observations
(TurnDownAfter), and a dummy variable indicating the addition of a certification in addiction
medicine between the two observations (Add_Cert_Gain). The other independent variables were
retained from the earlier of the two observations and the variables from the latter observation
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were deleted. Table 6.2 summarizes all of the independent variables used in the three
experiments.

TABLE 6.2 – Independent Variables
Variable
Sp_Addict
Sp_PCPtype
Sp_Anesth
Sp_PainMed

Meaning
Equals 1 if the physician indicated addiction medicine as a primary
specialty.
Equals 1 if the physician indicated internal medicine, family medicine or
pediatrics as a primary specialty.
Equals 1 if the physician indicated anesthesia as a primary specialty.
Equals 1 if the physician indicated pain medicine as a primary specialty.

Sp_Psychiatry

Equals 1 if the physician indicated psychiatry as a primary specialty.

Add_Cert

Equals 1 if the physician indicated one of three board certifications in
addiction medicine.

Set_Mul

Equals 1 if the physician identified a multi-specialty group practice as the
primary practice setting.

Set_Sha

Equals 1 if the physician identified a solo practice in a space shared with
other physicians as the primary practice setting.

Set_Sin

Equals 1 if the physician identified a single-specialty group practice as the
primary practice setting.

Set_Sol

Equals 1 if the physician identified a solo practice as the primary practice
setting.

Set_Sta

Equals 1 if the physician identified a staff-model HMO as the primary
practice setting.

Region_W

Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “West” region, as identified by
the Census.

Region_MW

Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “Midwest” region, as
identified by the Census.

Region_NE

Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “Northeast” region, as
identified by the Census.

Region_S

Equals 1 if the physician was located in the “South” region, as identified
by the Census.

Yr2007

Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2007.

Yr2008

Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2008.

Yr2009

Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2009.

Yr2010

Equals 1 if the observation occurred in calendar year 2010.
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TABLE 6.2 – Independent Variables, continued

PercentPract

Equals 0 if the physician indicated that 0% of the total medical practice
was devoted to treating substance abuse patients; equals 1 if the physician
indicated 1 – 20%; equals 2 if the physician indicated 21 – 40%; equals 3
if the physician indicated 41 – 60%; equals 4 if the physician indicated 61
– 80%; equals 5 if the physician indicated 81 – 100%.

Yrs_Practicing

The number of years for which the physician has been practicing medicine
at the time of the observation.

X_is_100

Equals 1 if the physician faced a caseload maximum of 100 patients at the
time of the observation.

Limit_MED

Equals 1 if the physician indicated that any issues related to the medicine
itself represent limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance
treatment.

Limit_FIN

Equals 1 if the physician indicated that any issues related to financial
considerations represent limitations associated with buprenorphine
maintenance treatment.
Independent variables specific to Experiment #2

Time_Diff

Equals the number of years (not necessarily an integer) elapsed between
the two observations.

Add_Cert_Gain

Equals 1 if the physician indicated holding one of three board
certifications in addiction medicine in the second, but not first, of the two
observations.

TurnDownAfter

Equals 1 if the physician indicated turning down any positive number of
patients due to the caseload maximum in the second of the two
observations.

The creation of the dependent variables was relatively straightforward. In some survey
waves, the physician was asked directly about the number of patients on “Withdrawal” or
“Maintenance” regimens, so for these waves, the simple answer to the latter question was
retained as the number of maintenance patients. This number was subtracted from the number of
total current buprenorphine patients (the sum of the number of patients on Subutex and the
number of patients on Suboxone) to determine the number of non-maintenance patients. In other
survey waves, the stages of treatment from which the physician could choose were given as
“Induction,” “Maintenance” or “Dose Tapering.” The number of patients in the maintenance
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phase was retained without change. Induction implies that the patient is in the first stage of
treatment. Dose tapering can occur at the end of induction and stabilization or, sometimes, at the
end of an extended period of time on maintenance. Most importantly, however, dose tapering
indicates that the physician does not intend to further maintain a long-term relationship with this
patient, regardless of the past history between patient and physician, so the number of patients in
the “dose tapering” phase of treatment was combined with the number of patients in the
“induction” phase of treatment to determine the number of non-maintenance patients. Two
variables were created for every observation: MainCurr, the current number of patients being
maintained, and NonMCurr, the current number of non-maintenance patients.
For Experiment #1, the dependent variable is MainCurr; for Experiment #3, the
dependent variable is NonMCurr. In both cases, the natural log of these patient counts were also
calculated, and labeled ln_MainCurr and ln_NonMCurr. For Experiment #2, the dependent
variables under consideration are both the difference in maintenance patients between
observations and the difference in non-maintenance patients between observations, Main_diff
and NonM_diff. Natural logs cannot be computed because in some cases the difference is
negative or zero.
Table 6.3 below gives the mean and standard deviation for all of the variables (dependent
and independent) that entered into the regression for Experiment #1. As seen in Table 6.3, for
Experiment #1, 46% of the respondents indicated a primary-care-type specialty, and 37%
reported psychiatry as a primary specialty. Thirty-eight percent reported holding a certification in
addiction medicine. The most popular practice setting was a solo practice (about 45%), followed
by a single-specialty group practice (21%). Observations were distributed relatively well across
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regions and years. Only slightly more than half of the observations (53%) were observations
where the physician likely faced a caseload maximum of 100 patients at the time of observation.
TABLE 6.3 – Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #1
Variable

Mean

St. Dev.

MainCurr

18.9505

18.2084

ln_MainCurr

2.4238

1.1195

Sp_Addict

0.2790

0.4486

Sp_PCPtype

0.4613

0.4986

Sp_Anesth

0.0245

0.1547

Sp_CommHealth

0.0034

0.0579

Sp_Neurology

0.0115

0.1068

Sp_PainMed

0.1174

0.3219

Sp_Psychiatry

0.3733

0.4838

Add_Cert

0.3805

0.4856

Set_Mul

0.0976

0.2969

Set_Sha

0.1025

0.3033

Set_Sin

0.2145

0.4106

Set_Sol

0.4459

0.4972

Set_Sta

0.0067

0.0818

Region_W

0.2136

0.4099

Region_MW

0.1837

0.3874

Region_NE

0.3155

0.4648

Region_S

0.2795

0.4488

Yr2007

0.1015

0.3021

Yr2008

0.2468

0.4312

Yr2009

0.2742

0.4462

Yr2010

0.2458

0.4307

PercentPract

2.8942

1.2961

Yrs_Practicing

20.3427

10.9309

X_is_100

0.5310

0.4992

Limit_MED

0.1448

0.3520

Limit_FIN

0.7730

0.4190
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Table 6.4 below provides descriptive statistics for the 75 observations associated with
Experiment #2. The mean difference for both patient types is positive, which indicates that, at
least on average, physicians who face a higher caseload maximum treat more maintenance and
non-maintenance patients. The three specialties represented in the data are all well-represented.
Just over half of the physicians (about 53%) are certified in addiction medicine at the time of the
first observation. Most of the observations are for physicians in solo practices (59%).

TABLE 6.4 - Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #2
Variable

Mean

St. Dev.

NonM_diff

6.3200

15.7593

Main_diff

24.1733

25.4704

Sp_Addict

0.4933

0.5033

Sp_PCPtype

0.4800

0.5030

Sp_Psychiatry

0.3200

0.4696

Time_Diff

2.7237

1.0420

Add_Cert_Gain

0.0667

0.2511

Add_Cert

0.5333

0.5022

Set_Sin

0.1067

0.3108

Set_Sol

0.5867

0.4957

Set_Sta

0.0267

0.1622

Region_W

0.1467

0.3562

Region_MW

0.2800

0.4520

Region_NE

0.3467

0.4791

PercentPract

3.5467

1.6627

Yrs_Practicing

19.6785

9.5725

TurnDownAfter

0.2533

0.4378

Limit_MED

0.0267

0.1622

Limit_FIN

0.7600

0.4300
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Table 6.5 below provides descriptive statistics for Experiment #3. The table shows that
addiction specialty, primary-care type specialties and psychiatry are the most popular, having
been selected by 36%, 39% and 42% of the responding physicians respectively. About 42% of
the physicians hold a board certification in addiction medicine. Solo practices were the most
frequent (29%), followed by single-specialty group practices (19%). About a third of the
observations come from 2006 or 2007, and the other two-thirds come from 2008 – 2010.
Only 18.5% of the observations in Experiment #3 occurred under an imputed caseload
maximum of 100 patients, which is significantly lower than Experiment #1’s 53%. This
underscores the possibility that physicians operating under a caseload maximum of 100 are likely
to treat maintenance and non-maintenance patients. A subsample of physicians that chooses not
to maintain patients is more likely going to include physicians that face a caseload maximum of
30. It could also be that this sample is self-selecting. Physicians who do not plan on maintaining
patients are less likely to perform a second notification in order to treat up to 100 patients.

6.3 ECONOMETRIC METHODS
Due to the panel nature of the survey data, it is possible that the errors in the data are not
independent and identically-distributed, a requirement of ordinary least squares estimation.
Though it has been argued (Gujarati, 2009) that the existence of heteroskedasticity impacts only
the standard errors (and thus inferences) of a regression model, without impacting the coefficient
estimates, Goodman and Thibodeau (1995) have pointed out that inaccurate characterization of
the variance can lead to parameter estimates that are likewise inaccurate. For the sake of accurate
parameter estimates and proper inference, the possibility of heteroskedasticity was explored for
the data in all three experiments.
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TABLE 6.5 - Descriptive Statistics for Experiment #3
Variable
NonMCurr

Mean
6.6641

St. Dev.
10.6883

ln_NonMCurr

1.2394

1.0873

Sp_Addict

0.3591

0.4807

Sp_PCPtype

0.3861

0.4878

Sp_Anesth

0.0232

0.1507

Sp_PainMed

0.0656

0.2481

Sp_Psychiatry

0.4170

0.4940

Add_Cert

0.4170

0.4940

Set_Mul

0.0734

0.2612

Set_Sha

0.0463

0.2106

Set_Sin

0.1853

0.3893

Set_Sol

0.2934

0.4562

Set_Sta

0.0309

0.1733

Region_W

0.2394

0.4275

Region_MW

0.1506

0.3583

Region_NE

0.2934

0.4562

Region_S

0.3050

0.4613

Yr2007

0.0965

0.2959

Yr2008

0.2124

0.4098

Yr2009

0.2355

0.4251

Yr2010

0.2317

0.4227

PercentPract

3.4440

1.6518

Yrs_Practicing

21.5844

12.3569

X_is_100

0.1853

0.3893

Limit_MED

0.2432

0.4299

Limit_FIN

0.6255

0.4849

Standard White tests (White, 1980) for heteroskedasticity were performed for the data
used in all of the Experiments, and the results are given in Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 below. To

67
perform the White test, the squared residuals from an OLS estimation of the data are regressed
against all of the regressors (and cross-products of the regressors) from the original equation.
Then, the LM statistic is calculated as n × R2, where n is the number of observations and R2 is the
R2 from the second regression of the squared residuals. This statistic has a χ2 distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors in the auxiliary squared residuals equation
minus one.
The null hypothesis of the White test is that there is no heteroskedasticity. One compares
the LM test statistic to the critical χ2 value and rejects the null hypothesis if the LM statistic is
greater than the critical value. In other words, if the LM statistic is higher than the critical value,
then the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that the data display heteroskedasticity.

TABLE 6.6 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #1
Dependent
variable
specification

n

R2 of auxiliary
regression

LM test
statistic

DF

Critical χ2
Critical χ2
value at 10% value at 5%

0.1125
234.0
248
276.9
285.7
Natural log of 2,080
patient count Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected.
2,080

0.2425

504.4

248

276.9

285.7

Patient count Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 5%
confidence level. There is sufficient reason to believe that heteroskedasticity
exists.
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TABLE 6.7 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #2
Dependent
variable

n

R2 of auxiliary
regression

LM test
statistic

DF

Critical χ2
Critical χ2
value at 10% value at 5%

Difference in
75
0.9013
67.5975
69
84.42
89.39
Non-Maintenance
Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected.
Patients
Difference in
Maintenance
Patients

75

0.9336

70.0200

69

84.42

89.39

Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected.

TABLE 6.8 – White test for Heteroskedasticity for the data from Experiment #3
Dependent
variable
specification

n

R2 of auxiliary
regression

LM test
statistic

DF

259

0.3719

213.9757

184

Critical χ2
Critical χ2
value at 10% value at 5%
209.0

216.6

Natural log of Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 10%
patient count confidence level, but not at the 5% level. There is some reason to believe that
heteroskedasticity exists.
259

0.5767

227.9718

184

209.0

216.6

Patient count Result: The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at the 5%
confidence level. There is sufficient reason to believe that heteroskedasticity
exists.

Ordinarily, the number of regressors in the auxiliary regression would be equal to (k2 +
3k)/2, where k is the number of regressors in the original OLS regression. In these cases,
however, the number of regressors in each auxiliary regression is smaller than this for two
reasons, both related to the binary nature of many of the independent variables. The square of a
binary variable would not be a unique variable, so it would not be included. Also, the crossproducts of many of the regressors were eliminated by the statistical software for creating
variables that were either not unique or were linear combinations of other variables. The degrees
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of freedom reported in the tables above are based on the number of regressors that the statistical
software used in the regression.
The results of the White tests on the data for Experiment #1 (Table 6.6) were mixed;
heteroskedasticity appears to be present in the data if the dependent variable is simply patient
count, but not if the dependent variable is the natural log of patient count.
The results for the White test on the data for Experiment #2 (Table 6.7) require some
explanation. Because of the regrettably low number of observations for Experiment #2 (due to
the restrictive definition of the subsample based on the KT conditions) and the fact that the
number of regressors in the auxiliary regression is relatively high, rejection of the null hypothesis
of no heteroskedasticity is mathematically impossible. The upper bound of the LM test statistic is
75—and the calculated test statistic is near to this upper bound—but the critical χ2 values are
84.42 and 89.39. For this reason, though the alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity is not
statistically accepted, the possibility of heteroskedasticity, and the need to correct it, will not be
entirely ruled out.
The results for the White test on the data for Experiment 3 (Table 6.8) confirm that
heteroskedasticity is likely present in the sample data. This offers further support that
heteroskedasticity could exist in the data for the first two experiments.
Because of the mixed or ambiguous results in some cases above, the regression analysis
was performed using a number of approaches to correcting for heteroskedasticity, and the results
from these approaches will be reported. One simple approach to correcting for heteroskedasticity
is to calculate what are known as heteroskedasticity-consistent (or “White”) standard errors. The
statistical software makes this task very simple. It calculates new standard errors so that proper
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inferences can be made, but parameter estimates are identical to those that would be achieved
through regular OLS estimation.
One other approach to correcting for heteroskedasticity is the one used by Goodman and
Thibodeau (1995), which comes from Davidian and Carroll (1987). This approach requires
iterative regressions. First, OLS methods are used to estimate the original regression equation,
and the residuals are retained. Then, the absolute values of these residuals are regressed against
variables from the original equation that are thought to be related to the heteroskedasticity. From
this second regression, predicted values of the dependent variable (absolute values of residuals)
are retained. These inverses of these predicted values are then used as weights in a weighted least
squares estimation of the original regression. This process is iterated until the parameter
estimates of the weighted least squares estimations converge and fail to be improved by further
iterations.
So for each of the three experiments, three sets of results are given: simple OLS estimates
with unadjusted standard errors, OLS estimates with White standard errors, and the weighted
least squares estimates from the final converged regression based on the iterative approach
suggested by Davidian and Carroll (1987).
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS
7.1 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #1 ON MAINTENANCE PATIENTS
Experiment #1 focused on the number of patients maintained on buprenorphine by
physicians who reported having both maintenance and non-maintenance patients but who did not
treat the maximum allowable number of patients. The empirical results from Experiment #1,
which had 2,080 observations, are given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below. Table 7.1 provides the
results for the specification that used the patient count as the dependent variable; Table 7.2
provides the results for the specification that used the natural log of the patient count as the
dependent variables. In both cases, the region dummy coefficients should be interpreted relative
to the excluded regions—Pacific and the Caribbean. The year dummy coefficients should be
interpreted relative to the excluded year, 2006. The practice setting dummy variable coefficients
should be interpreted relative to a hospital setting, the setting which was not included. Finally,
the X_is_100 variable coefficients are relative to a caseload limit of 30.
Section 4.5.1 gave the hypotheses for Experiment #1. With respect to specialty, it was
hypothesized that physicians with PCP-type specialties would be expected to have more patients
on maintenance, relative to physicians in other specialties; physicians with psychiatry as a
primary specialty would be expected to have fewer patients on maintenance, relative to
physicians in other specialties; and physicians who are addiction specialists, certified in
addiction medicine, or devote more of their practice to treating substance abusing patients would
be expected to have more patients on maintenance, relative to other physicians.
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TABLE 7.1 – Patient Count Results from Experiment #1
Dependent variable: Current Maintenance Patients, MainCurr
n =2,079

Ordinary Least Squares
2

R : 0.3640

2

Adj. R : 0.3559

Weighted Least Squares
R2: 0.428

Adj. R2: 0.4208

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

-4.6175

4.2172

2.8757

0.5553

2.6732

Sp_Addict

1.3416

0.8765

0.8970

0.7526

0.6815

Sp_PCPtype

1.8228

1.0869*

1.1574

1.6764

0.8577*

Sp_Anesth

-2.5694

2.2611

1.6487

-1.3372

1.3072

Sp_CommHealth

1.8790

5.6020

4.3185

1.6919

4.1856

Sp_Neurology

-1.0894

3.0759

2.1334

-2.3333

1.7950

Sp_PainMed

0.9934

1.2251

1.2407

0.3405

0.9182

Sp_Psychiatry

-2.7136

1.0746**

1.1203**

-1.4460

0.8298*

Add_Cert

0.8857

0.7222

0.7067

0.8565

0.5481

Set_Mul

1.6358

1.3904

1.3216

0.6147

0.9850

Set_Sha

0.5329

1.3873

1.2913

0.3062

0.9993

Set_Sin

1.7592

1.1659

1.0625*

1.2406

0.8353

Set_Sol

0.8288

1.0634

0.9687

0.1709

0.7463

Set_Sta

2.2028

4.0739

4.9689

0.8469

3.4745

Region_W

4.1337

3.7859

2.3138*

1.2937

2.2897

Region_MW

5.2016

3.8011

2.3563**

1.9849

2.3084

Region_NE

6.3479

3.7716*

2.2646***

2.7522

2.2679

Region_S

5.1203

3.7647

2.2624**

1.7229

2.2600

Yr2007

-2.4553

1.4449*

1.2410**

-1.5606

1.0588

Yr2008

-0.9776

1.1917

0.7634

-0.4559

0.7696

Yr2009

1.1283

1.1783

0.7410

0.2700

0.7695

Yr2010

0.8537

1.1779

0.7349

0.4239

0.7550

PercentPract

1.5224

0.3172***

0.3328***

1.2319

0.2576***

Yrs_Practicing

0.0516

0.0303*

0.0305*

0.0256

0.0230

X_is_100

19.8056

0.7321***

0.6314***

19.7569

0.5996***

Limit_MED

-2.7867

0.9197***

0.9031***

-1.1430

0.6839*

Limit_FIN

1.4670

0.7894*

0.7635*

1.1530

0.5752**

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
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Some of these hypotheses are confirmed by the empirical results. The patient-count
specification reported in Table 7.1 confirms that the coefficient on Sp_PCPtype is positive and
statistically significant in two of the three regressions. Sp_Psychiatry is negative and statistically
significant in all three regressions. Though Sp_Addict and Add_Cert fail to rise to statistical
significance in any of the regressions, they both have the right sign. Most importantly,
PercentPract is positive and statistically significant in all three regressions.
Turning to the natural-log specifications reported in Table 7.2, the variable Sp_PCPtype
is again positive and statistically significant in all three regressions. A physician in a primarycare-type specialty keeps 14% to 15% more patients on maintenance than does a physician not in
one of these specialties. In the natural log specification, the impact of a psychiatry specialty is
not statistically significant at all. The variable related to the percentage of a physician’s practice
dedicated to substance abuse patients is positive and statistically significant. Simply interpreted,
a 20% increase in the amount of his or her practice a physician dedicates to substance abuse
leads to a 9% increase in the number of patients treated through maintenance.
In general, the empirical results confirm the hypothesized effects of physician specialty
on the number of patients a physician will keep on maintenance: addiction specialists and
physicians with low market power will keep more patients on maintenance; there is limited
evidence that psychiatrists will keep fewer patients on maintenance.
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TABLE 7.2 – Natural Log of Patient Count Results from Experiment #1
Dependent variable: Natural Log of Current Maintenance Patients, ln_MainCurr
n = 2,079

Ordinary Least Squares
2

R : 0.3770

2

Adj. R : 0.3691

Weighted Least Squares
R2: 0.3829

Adj. R2: 0.375

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

1.0782

0.2566***

0.2302***

1.0742

0.2413***

Sp_Addict

0.0657

0.0533

0.0525

0.0680

0.0526

Sp_PCPtype

0.1303

0.0661**

0.0656**

0.1360

0.0654**

Sp_Anesth

-0.0717

0.1376

0.1203

-0.0800

0.1229

Sp_CommHealth

0.3552

0.3409

0.2398

0.3102

0.2951

Sp_Neurology

-0.0630

0.1872

0.1814

-0.0653

0.1878

Sp_PainMed

0.0567

0.0745

0.0705

0.0696

0.0721

Sp_Psychiatry

-0.1025

0.0654

0.0647

-0.1021

0.0648

Add_Cert

0.0595

0.0439

0.0438

0.0583

0.0436

Set_Mul

0.0975

0.0846

0.0819

0.0962

0.0837

Set_Sha

-0.0103

0.0844

0.0852

-0.0053

0.0850

Set_Sin

0.0811

0.0709

0.0697

0.0865

0.0707

Set_Sol

0.0266

0.0647

0.0626

0.0213

0.0643

Set_Sta

-0.0621

0.2479

0.2702

-0.0433

0.2642

Region_W

0.1771

0.2304

0.2095

0.1656

0.2134

Region_MW

0.2299

0.2313

0.2102

0.2190

0.2142

Region_NE

0.3404

0.2295

0.2080

0.3286

0.2121

Region_S

0.2114

0.2291

0.2071

0.1989

0.2119

Yr2007

-0.2127

0.0879**

0.0915**

-0.2072

0.0908**

Yr2008

-0.0940

0.0725

0.0718

-0.0869

0.0735

Yr2009

-0.0014

0.0717

0.0710

0.0117

0.0722

Yr2010

0.0146

0.0717

0.0701

0.0221

0.0719

PercentPract

0.0843

0.0193***

0.019***

0.0853

0.0190***

Yrs_Practicing

0.0010

0.0018

0.0018

0.0009

0.0018

X_is_100

1.2769

0.0446***

0.0442***

1.2801

0.0443***

Limit_MED

-0.1502

0.056***

0.0593**

-0.1512

0.0572***

Limit_FIN

0.1491

0.048***

0.0493***

0.1502

0.0494***

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
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In both specifications—patient count (Table 7.1) and natural log (Table 7.2), practice
setting fails to have any noticeable impact. The only exception is that the coefficient associated
with a single-specialty group practice is positive and statistically significant in the OLS
specification using White standard errors with patient-count as the dependent variable (Table
7.1). It was hypothesized in Section 4.5.1 that physicians in solo practices or single-specialty
group practices, where there is less potential for external costs to spill over into unrelated
practices, would be expected to keep more patients on maintenance. This one significant
coefficient is consistent with that hypothesis.
It was hypothesized that physicians with more years of experience would be expected to
keep more patients on maintenance. Table 7.1 reports that the coefficient on the variable
Yrs_Practicing is positive and statistically significant in the OLS specification, regardless of the
standard errors employed. Another two years of experience leads to one additional maintenance
patient, on average.
In the patient-count OLS specifications (Table 7.1), some of the region variables were
also statistically significant. There were no hypotheses regarding these variables, but it is
interesting to note that this implies that physicians in the continental U.S. keep more patients on
maintenance than do other U.S. physicians. The variable for Yr2007 was also statistically
significant for five of the six total specifications. Its sign is negative, indicating that physicians
kept fewer patients on maintenance in 2007 than in 2006. There is no obvious explanation for
why this might have been.
The two included variables that reflect physician attitudes are also statistically significant.
This is so for all of the specifications. The natural-log specification (Table 7.2) provides the best
interpretation of the results. When the physician views the medicine itself as a limitation, the
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number of patients on maintenance falls by 14%; when the physician views financial issues, such
as reimbursement, as limitations, the number of patients on maintenance is higher by 16%. This
latter result could be the result of endogeneity, suggesting that physicians who maintain a higher
number of patients are more likely to run into the financial issues surrounding the use of
buprenorphine. At the very least, this result suggests that financial issues are not sufficient to
prevent physicians from using buprenorphine to treat patients.
The dummy variable X_is_100 is positive and statistically significant in all six
specifications. This means that physicians who face a caseload maximum of 100 patients, rather
than just 30, kept more patients on maintenance. In fact, Table 7.2 confirms that when the patient
caseload maximum is 100 rather than 30, the number of patients kept on maintenance increases
by about 260%.
The empirical results of Experiment #1, which focused on the number of maintenance
patients for physicians with patients of both types, generally confirm the results predicted by the
algebraic model presented in Chapter 4. Physician specialty is related to market power and
opportunity cost as hypothesized in Chapter 4: physicians in primary-care type specialties and
physicians who specialize in addiction treatment keep more patients on maintenance relative to
other physicians; psychiatrists keep fewer patients on maintenance. There is limited evidence
that practice setting affects treatment costs. Experience practicing medicine reduces opportunity
costs of treating patients for substance abuse, and more experienced physicians treat more
patients. Most notably, physicians keep more than 3.5 times as many patients on maintenance
treatment when the caseload maximum increases to 3.33 times the lower 30-patient limit.
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7.2 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #2 ON RESPONSE TO CASELOAD LIMIT
INCREASE
The empirical results from Experiment #2 are given in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below.
Experiment #2 focused on the differences in the numbers of maintenance and non-maintenance
patients for physicians who appear to be bound by the federal caseload maximum. In essence,
this experiment tested most directly the impact of the change in the caseload maximum on
physician treatment choices. The variable Region_South was omitted. Due to the very small
number of observations, many specialties were omitted.
The very small sample size (n = 75) prevented this experiment from yielding substantial
results. Table 7.3 focuses on the difference in non-maintenance patients. Non-maintenance
patients include new patients in the induction and stabilization phases of treatment as well as
patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. The coefficient on the variable Sp_PCPtype is
positive and statistically significant in one of three specifications. This result suggests that a
physician in one of these specialties will have almost 7 more non-maintenance patients after an
increase in the maximum allowable caseload from 30 to 100. Table 7.3 also reports that
psychiatrists increase the number of non-maintenance patients by 10 after an increase in the
caseload maximum. Likewise, the coefficient on the variable Set_Sin, which indicates a singlespecialty group practice, is positive and statistically significant. These physicians increase nonmaintenance caseloads by 16.9 to 17.9 patients in response to the caseload maximum increase.
These results do not conform to the prediction generated by the algebraic model that the number
of non-maintenance patients should decrease. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that an
increase from 30 to 100 represents much more than a marginal increase, so that had the limit
increased only by a few patients, the algebraic model would be more relevant.
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TABLE 7.3 – Non-Maintenance Patients Difference Results from Experiment #2
Dependent variable: The difference in non-maintenance patients between observations,
NonM_diff
n = 75

Ordinary Least Squares
2

R : 0.2815

2

Adj. R : 0.0672

Weighted Least Squares
R2: 0.2814

Adj. R2: 0.0671

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

-9.4865

11.8888

10.2594

-8.0099

11.7294

Sp_Addict

5.8353

5.1419

3.7658

6.8541

4.7945

Sp_PCPtype

6.8875

4.7898

3.6281*

6.3691

4.6468

Sp_Psychiatry

10.2896

5.1701*

3.9710**

10.2073

4.7839**

Time_Diff

1.1783

1.8350

1.6777

0.4541

1.7643

Add_Cert_Gain

9.1702

8.1560

8.7051

6.5676

8.0527

Add_Cert

0.7293

4.9898

4.2770

0.2572

4.7754

Set_Sin

17.8606

8.0488**

9.0987*

16.8705

7.5820**

Set_Sol

5.7299

4.9673

3.4955

6.4812

4.7227

Set_Sta

4.5977

13.2435

8.2844

5.2028

12.2350

Region_W

9.8566

7.5182

6.7491

10.0510

7.4877

Region_MW

-2.0078

6.2128

4.6478

-1.5597

6.2296

Region_NE

3.5095

5.3772

5.1896

3.8978

5.4687

PercentPract

-0.0245

1.5920

1.2541

-0.2101

1.5418

Yrs_Practicing

0.1962

0.2327

0.2158

0.1646

0.2335

TurnDownAfter

4.3206

4.6059

4.2064

4.9112

4.4787

Limit_MED

-3.4982

12.8477

12.5874

-1.3093

13.1158

Limit_FIN

-13.3488

4.6928***

4.1454***

-11.8666

4.5414**

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%

While physicians in primary-care type specialties and psychiatrists are not alike with
respect to market power, they may be alike with respect to marginal treatment costs. For primary
care physicians, the opportunity cost of treating opioid dependence may be low since they often
treat a wide range of a patient’s health-related problems. For psychiatrists, training may reduce
the marginal cost of providing medication-assisted opioid dependence treatment. The lower
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marginal costs of treatment may explain why these physicians increase their patient counts so
dramatically relative to physicians in other specialties. If lower marginal costs of treatment are
also the reason for the positive coefficient on Set_Sin, then this could reveal that in singlespecialty group practices where buprenorphine treatment is being provided, there is consensus
about and openness to treating opioid dependence, so the possibility for external costs to spill
over onto other physicians is low.
Interestingly, Table 7.3 reports that the coefficient on Limit_FIN is statistically
significant in all three specifications and negative. This means that physicians who reported that
the financial issues—such as third party reimbursement—presented significant limitations to the
use of buprenorphine had fewer non-maintenance patients (between 11.9 and 13.3 fewer) after
the increase in the caseload maximum, compared to before the increase. So while Experiment #1
above suggested that financial considerations may not be enough to prevent physicians from
maintaining a high number of patients, this result suggests that, over time, these issues can cause
physicians to reduce the number of non-maintenance patients.
Turning to the results for the difference in the number of maintenance patients (Table
7.4), the most substantial result is the positive coefficient on the Sp_PCPtype variable, which is
statistically significant with or without corrections for heteroskedasticity. The results suggest that
physicians in internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics keep between 18.7 and 19.5
additional patients on maintenance after an increase in the caseload maximum. The coefficient
on Sp_Psychiatry is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that psychiatrists keep
about 15 more patients on maintenance after an increase in the caseload maximum. This
conforms to the hypothesis from Section 4.5.2 that the number of maintenance patients would be
expected to increase after an increase in the caseload maximum.
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TABLE 7.4 – Maintenance Patients Difference Results from Experiment #2
Dependent variable: The difference in maintenance patients between observations, Main_diff
n = 75

Ordinary Least Squares
2

R : 0.4057

2

Adj. R : 0.2284

Weighted Least Squares
R2: 0.4090

Adj. R2: 0.2327

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

-21.3940

17.4757

14.8984

-22.4462

17.2429

Sp_Addict

-3.7654

7.5583

6.3864

-3.1172

7.4343

Sp_PCPtype

18.7017

7.0406**

6.9477***

19.5343

7.0526***

Sp_Psychiatry

15.1681

7.5996*

6.7083**

15.0369

7.4286**

Time_Diff

7.4668

2.6973***

2.6320***

7.3420

2.6852***

Add_Cert_Gain

3.4214

11.9888

7.6566

3.6423

11.5307

Add_Cert

-1.8874

7.3347

6.3219

-1.9010

7.2513

Set_Sin

-3.0160

11.8311

8.8848

-2.2283

11.4615

Set_Sol

-0.1373

7.3017

7.1762

0.4200

7.0994

Set_Sta

-8.4349

19.4670

10.6289

-8.7697

19.5106

Region_W

-16.8043

11.0513

10.7311

-15.6269

10.8789

Region_MW

-10.2283

9.1324

9.7454

-11.0882

9.1349

Region_NE

-12.6937

7.9042

7.9867

-12.7439

7.9479

PercentPract

-0.0868

2.3401

1.8473

0.2241

2.3526

Yrs_Practicing

1.0527

0.3421***

0.3321***

1.0108

0.3430***

TurnDownAfter

7.4130

6.7704

7.2795

7.8099

6.6598

Limit_MED

-0.3607

18.8853

11.7735

1.0098

18.4480

Limit_FIN

2.7843

6.8982

4.9328

2.7500

6.7685

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%

Additionally, these two positive physician-specialty results are consistent with the results
from the non-maintenance side of this experiment (in Table 7.3) with two notable differences.
First, the magnitudes of the coefficients are greater in Table 7.4. This means that, while these
physicians increase their non-maintenance and maintenance caseloads after an increase in the
maximum total caseload, the increases in maintenance are greater. This is partially in line with
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the predictions of the algebraic model that maintenance caseloads should increase and nonmaintenance caseloads should decrease. Second, the coefficient on Sp_PCPtype is the greater of
the two in Table 7.4 and the smaller of the two in Table 7.3. This means that the nonmaintenance versus maintenance differential is greater for primary-care physicians. After the
increase in the caseload maximum, psychiatrists add to their caseloads about 1.5 maintenance
patients for every non-maintenance patient, but physicians in primary-care type specialties
(internal medicine, family medicine, pediatrics) add almost 3 maintenance patients for every
added non-maintenance patient.
The variable Time_Diff has a positive and statistically significant in all three
specifications. This simply reflects the time needed to acquire more patients and to move them
from induction and stabilization to maintenance. For each additional year (quarter) between
observations, the physician’s maintenance caseload increased by about 7.4 patients (1.9 patients).
Finally, the coefficient on the variable Yrs_Practicing is positive and statistically
significant in all three specifications. For every year of experience, a physician adds another 1
maintenance patient as a result of a caseload maximum increase from 30 to 100. The mean
number of years of experience in this experiment (see Table 6.4) was 19.7.
The primary result of the algebraic model was that the number of non-maintenance
patients should fall, and the number of maintenance patients should rise, after an increase in the
caseload maximum. These conclusions would have been most strongly supported by a negative
and statistically significant intercept for the NonM_diff model (Table 7.3), and a positive and
statistically significant intercept for the Main_diff model (Table 7.4). Both intercepts were
calculated to be negative and neither was statistically significant. However, it should be noted
that the estimated coefficients on the variables such as Sp_PCPtype, Sp_Psychiatry, TimeDiff
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and, most importantly, Yrs_Practicing in the Main_diff model are large enough in magnitude to
cause the change in the number of patients on maintenance to be positive, even in spite of the
negative intercept. So for many physicians, a higher caseload maximum leads to more patients
on maintenance.

7.3 RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT #3 ON NON-MAINTENANCE PATIENTS
The empirical results from Experiment #3 are given in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below.
Experiment #3, with a sample size of 259 observations, focused on physicians who reported
having no patients on maintenance but treated fewer non-maintenance patients than the federal
caseload maximum. Non-maintenance patients include new patients in the induction and
stabilization phases of treatment as well as patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. As in
Section 7.1, the omitted dummies are the Pacific and Caribbean for region, 2006 for year,
hospital for practice setting, and 30 for the caseload maximum.
Section 4.5.3 provides several hypotheses for the results of Experiment #3. The first
hypothesis involved physicians with PCP-type specialties. It was hypothesized that these
physicians would treat more non-maintenance patients, all else equal, than other physicians. The
coefficient on the Sp_PCPtype variable is only significant in the natural-log specification, and
only under the condition that heteroskedasticity is not corrected for. According to Table 6.8, the
null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be rejected at 10% confidence, but not 5%. (In the
other specifications, the coefficient has the appropriate sign, but is not statistically significant.)
According to the OLS result in Table 7.6, a physician in these specialties would treat 40% more
non-maintenance patients than a physician not in these specialties, consistent with the model
results from Section 4.5.3.
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TABLE 7.5 – Patient Count Results from Experiment #3
Dependent variable: Current Non-Maintenance Patients, NonMCurr
n = 259

Ordinary Least Squares
2

R : 0.2046

2

Adj. R : 0.1230

Weighted Least Squares
R2: 0.3581

Adj. R2: 0.2896

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

-5.5154

6.9846

4.2637

-4.0986

6.4943

Sp_Addict

2.5705

1.7635

1.7466

3.2286

1.1165***

Sp_PCPtype

2.7064

1.9077

1.7869

0.1035

1.1925

Sp_Anesth

-7.0428

4.5830

4.6536

1.2717

2.0639

Sp_PainMed

7.7793

3.1477**

5.2499

1.9511

2.7394

Sp_Psychiatry

3.1647

1.8810*

1.5925**

1.5949

1.1328

Add_Cert

1.1245

1.4516

1.7194

-0.9459

0.9332

Set_Mul

0.8037

2.6677

1.9870

1.2209

1.7460

Set_Sha

-2.0502

3.1963

1.4324

-0.7966

1.6009

Set_Sin

1.6131

1.9898

1.8172

-0.1775

1.2527

Set_Sol

1.1029

1.7664

1.6989

-0.4172

1.0742

Set_Sta

-1.3634

4.1219

2.4247

-3.6435

2.0109*

Region_W

4.8116

6.2099

2.7351*

5.6885

6.1264

Region_MW

5.7276

6.2441

2.9922*

7.9378

6.1135

Region_NE

7.7677

6.1483

3.5319**

6.9950

6.0881

Region_S

5.9907

6.1430

2.8334**

5.4970

6.0917

Yr2007

-2.9245

2.5376

1.9623

-0.8806

1.2490

Yr2008

-2.8067

2.0237

1.5615*

0.1845

1.1409

Yr2009

-1.7236

2.0712

1.6191

0.1397

1.3907

Yr2010

0.4103

2.0358

1.7214

0.2355

1.4493

PercentPract

-0.0349

0.5269

0.4166

0.6342

0.3403*

Yrs_Practicing

0.0400

0.0535

0.0504

0.0039

0.0337

X_is_100

9.5418

1.7464***

2.9001***

7.4560

1.8949***

Limit_MED

-0.5673

1.5780

1.5364

-0.0553

0.8858

Limit_FIN

0.3615

1.3505

1.1902

-0.9089

0.8062

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
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TABLE 7.6 – Natural Log of Patient Count Results from Experiment #3
Dependent variable: Natural Log of Current Non-Maintenance Patients, ln_NonMCurr
n = 259

Ordinary Least Squares

Weighted Least Squares

2

R2: 0.2249

R : 0.1778

2

Adj. R : 0.0934

Adj. R2: 0.1454

Independent
Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

White
Standard
Error

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

Intercept

0.4503

0.7224

0.4580

0.5832

0.4889

Sp_Addict

0.4035

0.1824**

0.1750**

0.4344

0.1721**

Sp_PCPtype

0.3388

0.1973*

0.2171

0.2627

0.1844

Sp_Anesth

-0.1905

0.4740

0.4834

-0.1001

0.4841

Sp_PainMed

0.2810

0.3256

0.4369

0.2094

0.3429

Sp_Psychiatry

0.3215

0.1945*

0.2020

0.2471

0.1815

Add_Cert

0.0349

0.1501

0.1514

0.0440

0.1373

Set_Mul

0.0763

0.2759

0.2851

0.0363

0.2660

Set_Sha

-0.6886

0.3306**

0.2255***

-0.7352

0.2526***

Set_Sin

-0.0192

0.2058

0.1988

-0.1204

0.1921

Set_Sol

-0.1376

0.1827

0.1741

-0.2210

0.1709

Set_Sta

-0.1747

0.4263

0.3233

-0.1715

0.3364

Region_W

0.2069

0.6423

0.2948

0.0729

0.3714

Region_MW

0.0789

0.6458

0.3309

0.0104

0.3958

Region_NE

0.2870

0.6359

0.3101

0.2021

0.3753

Region_S

0.2715

0.6354

0.2938

0.1401

0.3688

Yr2007

-0.2403

0.2625

0.2500

-0.1825

0.2387

Yr2008

-0.2717

0.2093

0.1944

-0.1728

0.1844

Yr2009

-0.1379

0.2142

0.2016

-0.1481

0.1934

Yr2010

-0.1098

0.2106

0.2037

-0.1360

0.2008

PercentPract

0.0957

0.0545*

0.0510*

0.1045

0.0497**

Yrs_Practicing

-0.0039

0.0055

0.0054

-0.0009

0.0052

X_is_100

0.6298

0.1806***

0.2116***

0.5810

0.1880***

Limit_MED

-0.1331

0.1632

0.1547

-0.2071

0.1464

Limit_FIN

0.0127

0.1397

0.1278

-0.0124

0.1272

* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
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It was also hypothesized in Section 4.5.3 that physicians in settings where costs are lower
would have more non-maintenance patients. The empirical results from Table 7.6 confirm this
result somewhat. Physicians who practice in a solo practice but in shared office space (Set_Sha)
have 49.8% to 52.1% fewer non-maintenance patients than do physicians in other practice
settings. This practice setting implies that costs associated with treating substance abusing
patients (primarily related to the patients themselves) spill over onto other physicians, but
coordination of services, economies of scale, and revenue sharing are not present. For these
reasons, the costs of treating substance abusing patients may be higher for the Set_Sha
physicians, which is why they have fewer patients.
The final hypothesis concerned those physicians who claimed addiction medicine as a
primary specialty, are board certified in addiction medicine, or who dedicate a higher percentage
of their practices to addiction treatment. Section 4.5.3 hypothesized that these physicians would
be expected to have more non-maintenance patients. Support for this hypothesis is not
overwhelming, but can be found throughout Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Starting with Table 7.5, the
coefficient on Sp_Addict in the weighted least squares regression is positive and statistically
significant, and these physicians have 3.2 more non-maintenance patients. In the same column,
the estimated coefficient on PercentPract is also positive and statistically significant, though the
magnitude of this effect is small; a 20% increase in the amount of a physician’s practice that is
dedicated to treating substance abuse results in 0.63 more non-maintenance patients.
Turning to Table 7.6, the Sp_Addict coefficient is statistically significant under all three
sets of conditions, and indicates that physicians specializing in addiction medicine will have
49.7% to 54.4% more non-maintenance patients, relative to physicians not claiming this primary
specialty. The PercentPract coefficient is also positive and statistically significant in all three
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cases, suggesting that a 20% increase in the amount of a physician’s practice dedicated to
treating substance abuse results in a 10% to 11% increase in the number of non-maintenance
patients.
The OLS results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 both suggest that psychiatrists have more nonmaintenance patients than do other physicians, all else equal. Using the estimate from the natural
log specification, a psychiatrist will have 37.9% more of these patients. In terms of the model,
this could only be the result of lower market power or lower marginal cost. For psychiatrists, the
latter is a more likely explanation. If so, these results suggest that the lower marginal opportunity
costs of treating opioid dependent patients with buprenorphine is significant enough to make up
for the effect of higher market power among psychiatrists.
The pain medicine specialty is statistically significant and increases the number of
patients, according to the OLS results of the patient-count specification in Table 7.5. This result
is not confirmed anywhere else on Table 7.5 or on Table 7.6. As discussed above with respect to
psychiatrists, it could be that pain medicine specialists face lower marginal opportunity costs for
providing treatment with buprenorphine than do other physicians.
Another anomalous result is the statistically significant and negative estimated coefficient
on Set_Sta for the weighted least squares regression with the patient-count specification (Table
7.5). This result suggests that physicians in staff-model HMOs will have 3.6 fewer nonmaintenance patients than physicians in other practice settings, all else equal. The model from
Chapter 4 predicts that lower patient counts can be related to more market power or higher
marginal costs, neither of which seems reasonable. Physicians in HMOs have essentially no
market power in the sense in which it is being used here. Further, costs such as the need to find
associated support services, etc., should be lower in an HMO, not higher. It could be that the
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marginal revenue of treating a patient for opioid dependence with buprenorphine is everywhere
lower than the marginal cost (which might also be low), so that physicians in HMOs choose to
withdraw no (or very few) patients. In other words, under capitation, if the patient is already a
patient, treating their substance abuse delivers a marginal revenue of zero dollars.
In the OLS results of the patient-count specification (Table 7.5), many of the regionspecific dummies had statistically significant coefficients only when interpreted using the White
standard errors. The model provides no guidance on what the expected signs of these coefficients
should be, but they are all positive, suggesting that physicians in the continental U.S. have more
patients than other U.S. physicians. This result also suggests that region may be related to the
heteroskedasticity observed in this sample. (See Table 6.8 for the results of the White test for
heteroskedasticity.)
Similar to a result from Experiment #1, the variable for Yr2008 was statistically
significant, but only for the OLS regression of the patient-count specification, and only when
interpreted using the White standard errors. Its sign is negative, indicating that these nonmaintaining physicians had fewer patients in 2008 than in 2006. There is no obvious explanation
for why this might have been.
The final result from Experiment #3 that deserves attention is the everywherestatistically-significant estimated coefficient on the X_is_100 variable in Tables 7.5 and 7.6.
Using the data from Table 7.6, the results suggest that a physician that faces a caseload
maximum of 100 has between 78.8% and 87.7% more non-maintenance patients than a physician
that faces a caseload maximum of 30. There are two ways to interpret this result with respect to
proper substance abuse treatment. On the one hand, increasing the caseload maximum causes
more patients to be able to enter treatment for opioid abuse. On the other hand, many of these
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patients may be treated by physicians who have thus far chosen never to maintain any patients,
despite the TIP’s recommendations to the contrary. It is not clear what phase of treatment these
additional non-maintenance patients are in. If they are in induction or stabilization, it is possible
that they may be kept on a maintenance regimen as a result of the increase in the caseload
maximum.
To summarize, the results of Experiment #3, which focused on the number of patients
being treated by physicians who do not report having any patients on maintenance, conform
somewhat to the predictions of the model of Chapter 4. There is limited evidence that physicians
in primary-care type specialties treated more patients than other physicians, as predicted by the
model, due to lower market power and lower opportunity costs. Physicians in solo practices in
shared office space treat fewer patients than do other physicians, suggesting that the physician
considers costs that spill over onto other physicians in the shared space. In Chapter 4, it was
predicted that physicians who were addiction specialists would be willing to treat more patients
than other physicians, and the empirical results of Experiment #3 confirm this prediction.
Finally, physicians who do not maintain patients take on significantly higher numbers of patients
at higher caseload maximums than they do at lower caseload maximums.

7.4 A SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 7.7 below summarizes the predicted results and actual results of all three
experiments. In general, the three experiments confirm the predicted results of the model from
Chapter 4.
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TABLE 7.7 – Summary of Experimental Results
Experiment

Experiment #1:
This experiment
explores the number
of patients
maintained on
buprenorphine
(m = q × y) for
physicians who
report having both
maintenance and
non-maintenance
patients, but who
treat fewer total
patients than the
maximum allowable
caseload.

Predicted Results

Actual Results

Physicians in primary-care
specialties will maintain more
patients.

Confirmed. These physicians keep
14% to 15% more patients on
maintenance.

Psychiatrists will maintain fewer
patients.

Confirmed. Psychiatrists keep 1 to 3
fewer patients on maintenance
relative to other physicians.

Physicians with attachment to
addiction treatment will maintain
more patients.

Confirmed. A one-category increase
(e.g., from between 1 and 20% to
between 21 and 40%) in the
percentage of practice dedicated to
substance abuse treatment increases
the number of patients on
maintenance by 9%.

Partially confirmed. Physicians in
single-specialty group practices
Physicians in solo practices or
maintain 2 more patients than
single-specialty group practices will
physicians in other settings. There
keep more patients on maintenance.
was no statistically significant
impact from solo practice setting.
Confirmed. The number of patients
Physicians subject to higher
being maintained rises by 260%
caseload maximums will keep more
when the caseload maximum rises
patients on maintenance.
by 233%, from 30 to 100.
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TABLE 7.7 – Summary of Experimental Results, continued
Experiment

Experiment #2:
This experiment
explores differences
in the numbers of
maintenance and
non-maintenance
patients after an
increase in the
allowable caseload
maximum.

Experiment #3:
This experiment
explores the number
of non-maintenance
patients (q) by
physicians who
report having no
patients on
maintenance, but who
treat fewer total
patients than the
maximum allowable
caseload.

Predicted Results

Actual Results

Not supported. The intercept, though
negative, does not achieve statistical
Physicians will have fewer nonsignificance, perhaps because an
maintenance patients after an
increase in the caseload maximum. increase from 30 to 100 does not
constitute a marginal change.
Partially confirmed. The intercept
has the wrong sign but is not
statistically significant. When its
magnitude is compared to other
Physicians will have more
positive and statistically significant
maintenance patients after an
results, it is clear that many
increase in the caseload maximum.
physicians respond to the higher
caseload maximum by increasing
the number of patients on a
maintenance regimen.
Physicians in primary-care
specialties will have more nonmaintenance patients.

Confirmed. Physicians in these
specialties will have 40% more nonmaintenance patients than
physicians in other specialties.

Physicians with attachment to
addiction treatment will have more
non-maintenance patients.

Confirmed. Physicians who declare
addiction medicine as a primary
specialty have 50% or more
additional non-maintenance patients
than other physicians.

Physicians in solo practices or
single-specialty group practices
(where costs are lower) will have
more non-maintenance patients.

Partially confirmed. Though the
coefficients on these practice
specialties are not significant,
physicians in shared non-group
office space (where opportunity
costs are higher) have 50% fewer
non-maintenance patients relative to
physicians in other settings.

Confirmed. The number of nonPhysicians subject to higher
maintenance patients rises by 79 caseload maximums will have more
88% when the caseload maximum
non-maintenance patients.
rises from 30 to 100.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
8.1 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Three experiments were performed in Chapter 7: one on the number of maintenance
patients (Experiment #1), one on the number of non-maintenance patients (Experiment #3), and
one on the differences in the numbers of patients of both types after a change in the caseload
maximum (Experiment #2). Non-maintenance patients include new patients in the induction and
stabilization phases of treatment as well as patients being withdrawn from buprenorphine. In
general, the results of the three experiments confirm the predictions of the algebraic model that
was presented in Chapter 4.
Physician specialty appears to reveal much about physician market power and
opportunity costs. Physicians in primary-care-type specialties (like internal medicine, family
medicine and pediatrics) treat more patients than do physicians in other specialties. The results of
Experiment #1 suggest that physicians in these specialties maintain 14% to 15% more patients
than do other physicians (see Table 7.2); the results of Experiment #3 suggest that these
physicians have 40% more non-maintenance patients than do other physicians (see Table 7.6).
The physicians in the sample for Experiment #1 also had non-maintenance patients, but the
physicians in Experiment #3 did not have any patients on maintenance, so the difference in the
magnitudes of these effects cannot be interpreted. Experiment #2 explored changes in patient
counts as a result of changes in the caseload maximum, and its results confirmed that physicians
in primary-care-type specialties will increase the number of patients of both types in response to
an increase in the caseload maximum. For these physicians, the increase in maintenance patients
is thrice the increase in non-maintenance patients.

92
Physicians with professional attachment to addiction treatment treat more patients than
do other physicians, likely because they face lower opportunity costs. Professional attachment to
addiction treatment is demonstrated in the survey data by certification in addiction medicine, by
the choice of addiction medicine as a primary specialty, or by the percentage of a physician’s
practice dedicated to treating patients for substance abuse. In Experiment #1, only the percentage
of practice dedicated to treating substance abuse has a significant effect on the number of
patients on maintenance. The results of Experiment #3 suggest that physicians who declare
addiction medicine as a primary specialty have 50% more non-maintenance patients than
physicians who do not (see Table 7.6).
Practice setting appears to reveal less about market power and opportunity cost, so there
are only limited results that link practice setting to physician treatment choices. The results from
Experiment #3 suggest that for physicians who do not report having any patients on maintenance
treatment, practice settings such as a solo practice in a shared office space and staff-model HMO
are both negatively related to the number of patients treated. It could be that lack of economies of
scale in solo practices, combined with the potential for costs to spill over, lead these physicians
to treat fewer patients. Physicians in HMOs may be subject to payment by capitation, whereby
treating current patients for their addictions may not generate any marginal revenue. Practice
setting is a complicated variable. The possibilities for economies of scale, cost sharing, revenue
sharing, and access to physicians in related specialties all suggest that in order for the impact of
practice setting to be fully explored, the model may have to be extended to include these specific
elements.
The most important results from the experiments in Chapter 7 relate to the impact of the
caseload maximum on the number of maintenance patients (Experiment #1) and non-
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maintenance patients (Experiment #3). In all regression specifications, the dummy variable
indicating that the physician faced a higher caseload maximum, X_is_100, was positive and
statistically significant. Specifically, all three experiments confirm that the incidence of
maintenance treatment rises as the caseload maximum increases.
Physicians with excess treatment capacity (with respect to the federal caseload
maximum) and patients of both types (Experiment #1) will increase the number of patients on
maintenance by 2.5 times when the caseload maximum increases by 2.33 times. This means that
in response to the caseload maximum, these physicians either reduce their excess capacity to
maintain more patients, or they have fewer non-maintenance patients. The empirical results from
Experiment #3 on non-maintenance patients show that physicians who choose not to maintain
patients also increase the number of patients they treat in response to an increase in the caseload
maximum, but they increase this number proportionately less.
The results of the difference-in-maintenance regressions in Experiment #2 (see Table 7.4)
also confirm this result. Though the intercept is negative, it is not statistically significant.
Further, many of the other coefficients are positive and greater in magnitude (especially when
combined) than the negative intercept. Physicians in primary-care type specialties and with the
average number of years of experience will maintain nearly 40 more patients after the increase in
the caseload maximum (or about 18 more after considering the negative intercept).

8.2 LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This study is subject to several limitations in addition to low numbers of observations for
Experiment #2 (75) and Experiment #3 (259). First, it made use of data that were originally
collected for an entirely different purpose. Though the data yielded compelling results, a survey
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instrument specifically designed for the purposes of this study might have resulted in richer
results. The survey data allowed for a distinction between the number of maintenance patients
and the number of non-maintenance patients but did not include any measure of visit count or
visit intensity in either case. In general, induction and stabilization require more, and more
frequent, visits than does maintenance, but physicians may differ in the number of visits they
require during these early phases of treatment, as well as the intensity of those visits with respect
to tests and other services ordered. Visit frequency and visit intensity in maintenance is subject
perhaps to even wider variation. The empirical model necessarily treats all “non-maintenance”
patients alike and all “maintenance” patients alike, but in practice, physicians may vary in their
ability and willingness to induce more or fewer (or more intense or less intense) visits. The
algebraic model implicitly assumed that all non-maintenance patients were in the induction and
stabilization phases of treatment, but they could also have been in the dose reduction phase.
The model also does not consider patient expectations over treatment, but treats the
decision about maintenance as solely the physician’s decision. While this is approximately the
case, in order to explore the role of demand inducement in treatment with buprenorphine, it
would be necessary to have patient-level data that revealed what patients wanted from treatment.
The substance abuse treatment community has formed a consensus with respect to the proper use
of buprenorphine, but it is not clear how well patient goals or expectations align with these
treatment protocols.
The analysis also ignores any potential impact of third-party payment, whether by private
medical insurance or public assistance such as block grants. Because financial considerations
appear to play some role in the physician’s decision to prescribe buprenorphine (and for what
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purpose to prescribe it) these missing data may limit the proper interpretation of the results of
Chapter 7.
The data used in the empirical work of Chapters 6 and 7 contain physician-level data
about current caseloads. It does not allow for the calculation of 1) the rate at which induction or
stabilization is successful, 2) the rate at which successfully-stabilized patients are maintained on
buprenorphine or 3) the rate at which maintenance patients are eventually withdrawn. If
physicians inexperienced with buprenorphine have lower success rates in induction and
stabilization, then their pools of potential maintenance patients are likewise smaller. Over time
(or during the one year that elapses between first and second DEA notifications), inexperienced
physicians may make marginally greater strides in their success rates, causing the empirical
results to overestimate the effect of physician specialty on responses to the caseload maximum.
The final, and perhaps most important, limitation of the study is the fact that the data did
not include an exact record of the caseload maximum faced by the physician at the time of the
observation. The current caseload maximum had to be imputed. Though the imputation was
rigorous, it would have been preferable to have physician-reported data to ensure that this
variable was not miscoded. Given the imputation and sample creation methods discussed in
Chapter 6, it is more likely that some physicians who actually faced only 30-patient caseload
maximums were misidentified as physicians who faced 100-patient caseload maximums. In this
case, it is possible that the analysis in Chapter 7 underestimates the true impact of the increase in
the federal caseload maximum.
In addition to addressing the limitations noted above, the analysis of the preceding
chapters could be extended. Over time, more observations will become available, allowing
Experiments #2 and #3 to be repeated. Higher numbers of observations could also allow for an
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increase in the number of independent variables (and interaction terms) included in the
regressions. This could allow for more detailed analysis of the differential impact of caseload
maximums on physicians in different specialties, different settings, or different specialty/setting
combinations.
The model presented in Chapter 4 assumed that the physician was able to induce demand
for maintenance treatment (in either a positive or negative direction). The model could be
extended with the formulation of a non-inducement companion model. The comparative statics
results of the two models could be compared to each other—and also to the empirical results—to
perform tests on the null hypothesis of no demand inducement in the spirit of Schaafsma (1994).
In this way, the analysis performed here could contribute to the literature on supplier-induced
demand by providing another unique test.
The model was also only a two-period model, eliminating the possibility of maintenancethen-withdrawal as a possible treatment path. The model could be extended either to a three
period model or an infinite-time-horizon model. An extended model of this type could take
advantage of the ability to separate in the data “new” patients (in induction or stabilization) from
“withdrawal” patients (those in dose reduction).

8.3 SUMMARY
The results of this study, presented in the last chapter, support the conclusion that many
factors other than recommended treatment protocols may enter into physician decision-making.
Federal caseload maximums have a clear impact on both the volume of treatment for opioid
dependence as well as the nature of this treatment. Increased federal caseload maximums lead to
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an increase of patients maintained on buprenorphine that is disproportionately greater than the
increase in total patient counts.
The physician’s specialty and professional attachment to substance abuse treatment also
influence the choice of treatment path. Physicians in specialties with lower opportunity costs and
less market power (such as internal medicine, family medicine or pediatrics) treat more patients
at any given federal caseload maximum than do physicians in other specialties. Though these
physicians respond to increased federal caseload maximums by having both more maintenance
patients and more non-maintenance patients, they add about three patients to their maintenance
caseload for every one additional non-maintenance patient. Psychiatrists appear to maintain
fewer patients (Table 7.1) and have more non-maintenance patients (Tables 7.5 and 7.6) than do
physicians in other specialties, but they respond to an increase in the caseload maximum by
disproportionately increasing the number of patients they keep on maintenance (Tables 7.3 and
7.4). As should be expected, physicians with professional attachment to substance abuse
treatment (demonstrated by board certification, primary specialty, or percentage of practice
dedicated to substance abuse treatment) treat more patients of both types than do other
physicians.
Policymakers should bear in mind that restrictions placed on physicians—such as the
federal caseload maximum for waivered physicians using buprenorphine to treat opioid
dependence—can have significant impacts on the treatment decisions made by physicians.
Physicians are not homogenous. Specialty, practice setting, board certification, years of
experience and other variables are all related to the physician’s treatment choice. This is true
even with respect to conditions for which there is considerable consensus in the research and
academic communities regarding treatment. Even in the face of strong and consistent support for
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medication-assisted maintenance treatment of opioid dependence, and recommended protocols
and training that endorse the same, many physicians still offer limited maintenance treatment.
This could be the result of ideology, but this study supports the notion that economic
considerations also enter into physician decision-making.
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APPENDIX A: THE PHYSICIAN SURVEY
PHYSICIAN SURVEY, TEXT OF SELECTED QUESTIONS, Version 4/1/05
1. What do you consider to be your primary specialty? (Mark no more than three)
•

Addictions

•

Allergy

•

Anesthesiology

•

Cardiology

•

Community Health

•

Dermatology

•

Emergency Medicine

•

Endocrinology

•

Family Medicine

•

Gastroenterology

•

Immunology

•

Internal Medicine

•

Neurology

•

Ob-Gyn

•

Occupational Medicine

•

Oncology

•

Pain Medicine

•

Pediatrics

•

Psychiatry
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•

Pulmonary Medicine

•

Rehabilitation Medicine

•

Surgery

•

Other Specialty

2. How many years have you been licensed to practice medicine, in any state?
____ Years of practice
3. Mark any of these certifications in addiction medicine that you currently hold.
•

American Board of Medical Specialties

•

American Society of Addiction Medicine

•

American Osteopathic Association

•

Not certified in addiction medicine

4. Which of these best describes your current practice? If you are involved in more than one
practice, select the one where you are most likely to care for substance abusing patients. (Select
only one)
•

Solo practice

•

Solo practice, space shared with other physicians

•

Single specialty group practice

•

Multispecialty group practice

•

Hospital-owned practice

•

Staff model HMO

•

Other type of practice

6. On which date are you filling out this section of the survey?
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________ / ________
Month

/ ________

Day

Year

9. What percentage of your total medical practice during this period would you estimate was
devoted to treating substance abuse patients?
•

0%

•

1 - 20%

•

21 - 40%

•

41 - 60%

•

61 - 80%

•

81 - 100%

11. Within the past 90 days, how many patients have you treated with buprenorphine for opioid
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of whether or not you are seeing them under a CSAT
Waiver?
________ Buprenorphine patients
12. How many patients are you currently treating with Suboxone and Subutex for opioid
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of whether or not you are seeing them under a CSAT
Waiver?
________ Suboxone ________ Subutex

13. How many of these patients currently on Suboxone or Subutex are on maintenance and how
many are on a withdrawal regimen?
________ Maint. ________ Wdwl.
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14. What do you think are the limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance treatment?
(Mark no more than three)
•

Titration of dose is difficult/time consuming

•

High cost

•

Inadequate third-party reimbursement

•

Low patient acceptance or interest

•

Limited effectiveness

•

Likelihood of adverse events

•

Medical complications

•

Difficulty accessing counseling or other services

•

Lack of pharmacies carrying buprenorphine

•

Diversion risk

•

Federal patient limit

•

Recordkeeping requirements

•

Concern about DEA involvement

•

Other ______________________ Specify (print)

15. In the past 90 days, how many individuals did you turn down for buprenorphine treatment
because of the federal limit on physicians’ buprenorphine caseloads?
________ Patients turned down

PHYSICIAN SURVEY, TEXT OF SELECTED QUESTIONS, Version 4/7/08
1. What do you consider to be your primary specialty? (Mark no more than three)
•

Addictions
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•

Allergy

•

Anesthesiology

•

Cardiology

•

Community Health

•

Dermatology

•

Emergency Medicine

•

Endocrinology

•

Family Medicine

•

Gastroenterology

•

Immunology

•

Internal Medicine

•

Neurology

•

Ob-Gyn

•

Occupational Medicine

•

Oncology

•

Pain Medicine

•

Pediatrics

•

Psychiatry

•

Pulmonary Medicine

•

Rehabilitation Medicine

•

Surgery

•

Other Specialty
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2. How many years have you been licensed to practice medicine, in any state?
____ Years of practice
3. Mark any of these certifications in addiction medicine that you currently hold.
•

American Board of Medical Specialties

•

American Society of Addiction Medicine

•

American Osteopathic Association

•

Not certified in addiction medicine

4. Which of these best describes your current practice? If you are involved in more than one
practice, select the one where you are most likely to care for substance abusing patients. (Select
only one)
•

Solo practice

•

Solo practice, space shared with other physicians

•

Single specialty group practice

•

Multispecialty group practice

•

Hospital-owned practice

•

Staff model HMO

•

Other type of practice

5. How long have you been certified to prescribe buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid
dependence?
•

Less than 1 year

•

1 - 2 years

•

3 - 4 years
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•

More than 4 years

8. On which date are you filling out this section of the survey?
________ / ________
Month

Day

/ ________
Year

11. What percentage of your total medical practice during this period would you estimate was
devoted to treating substance abuse patients?
•

0%

•

1 - 20%

•

21 - 40%

•

41 - 60%

•

61 - 80%

•

81 - 100%

13. Within the past 90 days, how many patients have you treated with buprenorphine for opioid
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of where you saw them.
________ Buprenorphine patients
14. How many patients are you currently treating with Suboxone and Subutex for opioid
dependence? Count all patients, regardless of where you see them.
________ Suboxone ________ Subutex
Note— In answering questions 15 and 16, be sure the total number of patients reported always
equals the total patients on Suboxone and Subutex reported in question 14.
16. How many of your patients, in all settings, are in the following phases of buprenorphine
treatment?
________ Induction ________ Maintenance ________ Dose tapering
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19. In the past 90 days, how many individuals did you turn down for buprenorphine treatment
because of the federal limit on physicians’ buprenorphine caseloads?
________ Patients turned down
20. What do you think are the limitations associated with buprenorphine maintenance treatment?
(Mark no more than three)
•

Titration of dose is difficult/time consuming

•

High cost

•

Inadequate third-party reimbursement

•

Low patient acceptance or interest

•

Limited effectiveness

•

Likelihood of adverse events

•

Medical complications

•

Difficulty accessing counseling or other services

•

Lack of pharmacies carrying buprenorphine

•

Diversion risk

•

Federal patient limit

•

Recordkeeping requirements

•

Concern about DEA involvement

•

Other ______________________ Specify (print)
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In 2000, changes in federal law allowed physicians to receive waivers to use narcotic
medications, such as buprenorphine, for treatment of opioid dependence. As of 2006, physicians
have been allowed to treat up to 100 patients after spending one year at a 30-patient limit.
Physicians may choose to discontinue use of buprenorphine after the patient has successfully
discontinued use of the substance of abuse ("withdrawal"), or physicians can keep patients on
buprenorphine indefinitely ("maintenance"). The model in this dissertation assumes that demand
for treatment of opioid dependence is exogenous but that demand for maintenance treatment can
be induced by the physician. Using data from quarterly surveys of physicians from 2006 to 2010,
this dissertation analyzes the impact of the higher caseload limit on the number of patients and
the treatment path chosen by the physician. It finds support for the conclusion that physicians
treat more patients after an increase in the caseload limit. The impact is particularly strong for
maintenance, suggesting that the caseload limit discourages maintenance treatment. The
dissertation also finds that this effect is stronger for physicians in primary-care type specialties.
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